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ABSTRACT 
The Southern Ocean Patagonian toothfish stock has been nearly decimated by 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources has unsuccessfully relied on flag State control of 
fishing vessels to check the illegal fishery. Serious violations of the Commission's 
conservation measures have been conducted by vessels flagged to non-members but 
owned and operated by nationals of CCAMLR's Contracting Parties. Direct targeting 
of those nationals is necessary to establish effective control over their extra-territorial 
activities. Contemporary law of the sea obligates CCAMLR Parties to exercise any 
species of legal authority possessed to protect the Southern Ocean marine 
environment and the fish stocks within it. The traditional exclusivity of flag State 
jurisdiction has narrowed and tolerates a number of exceptions to this end. 
Nationality is a recognised basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over 
nationals has been embodied in a number of high seas fisheries instruments. 
Incorporation of Nationality jurisdiction as an explicit responsibility of its Contracting 
Parties would equip CCAMLR with a powerful tool with which to protect the 
Patagonian toothfish stock from illegal fishing and thereby to salvage its own 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, abstract, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexes) comprises approximately 11 200 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Harvesting of global fish stocks increased explosively over the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Fishing effort outstripped the capacity of the world's oceans 
to meet the demands of its over capitalised fishing industry. The long held belief that 
the sea could provide an inexhaustible source of nutrition was soundly discredited. 
The burgeoning capability of increasingly sophisticated vessels coupled with pressure 
to feed expanding populations led to a search for new fishing grounds and potential 
target species. 1 Eventually, that search led global fishing interests to the Southern 
Ocean and the Patagonian toothfish. 
Like other finfish species in the Southern Ocean, Patagonian toothfish is 
vulnerable to over-fishing due to its slow growth and low productivity. 2 Taken only 
as a by-catch until the mid- l 980s, the stock has come under enormous pressure in 
recent years, in particular through illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. 3 
Since the mid-1990s, Patagonian toothfish has been a highly prized directed catch 
commanding high prices in the international market. 4 It has also been, since then, the 
target of levels of fishing activity so high as to have pushed the stock almost to 
extinction.5 
The efforts of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) to control over-exploitation of the species have 
foundered in part because of non-cooperation by some nationals of its member States.6 
Flagged to non-Parties, a number of Party State owned and operated vessels have 
fished with impunity outside CCAMLR's conservation framework. This illegal 
fishery has not only decimated stocks of Patagonian toothfish and damaged the eco-
1 See generally Christopher C Joyner "Compliance and Enforcement in New International Fisheries Law" (1998) 12 Temp Int'l & Comp L J 271 , 271-2. 
2 The Patagonian toothfish is a sub-Antarctic oily white fleshed demersal fish of long life span, late sexual maturity and low fecundity. See Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1997) paragraph 5.47. 
3 DJ Agnew "The Illegal and Unregulated Fishery for Toothfish in the Southern Ocean, and the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme" (2000) 24 Marine Policy 361 , 362. 4 Market prices of Patagonian toothfish range from $5000 - 7000/tonne. See ASOC "Southern Ocean Goldrush" (1997) The Antarctic Proj ect 6(2) 3-4 . 
5 Beth C Clark and Alan D Hemmings "Problems and Prospects for CCAMLR Twenty Years On" (2001) 4 Journal oflnternational Wildlife Law and Policy 1, 4. 6 Gail Lutgen "The Rise and Fall of the Patagonian Toothfish: Food for Thought" (1997) 27 Envl Pol & Law 401 , 402. 
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system of which it is part, but has also undermined CCAMLR's legitimacy in the eyes 
of the international community. 7 
The failure of CCAMLR's reliance on the flag States of such vessels to reign in 
their piracy has prompted calls from some quarters for Contracting Parties to act 
directly to control their citizens and companies.8 Yet, despite the perilous State of 
Patagonian toothfish stocks, an initiative to this effect put to the CCAMLR 
Commission in 1998 was rebuffed as some members resolutely sought to preserve the 
exclusive sovereignty of such vessels ' flag States. 
Three years later, there is an even greater sense of urgency in international 
fisheries management. The concept of using 'nationality' jurisdiction has gained 
greater currency in the international community. States' obligations as regards 
conservation of high seas stocks have been defined with greater clarity. Accordingly, 
it may be time for CCAMLR to consider the 'nationals' option again. 
This paper seeks to demonstrate that obliging Parties to exercise jurisdiction 
over their nationals to compel their compliance with the regime's conservation 
measures would be a legitimate course for CCAMLR to follow, and one not 
necessarily inconsistent with flag States ' traditionally exclusive jurisdiction on the 
high seas. Part II of this paper describes CCAMLR and the nature of the illegal 
fishing problem it faces. Part III identifies the obligations of conservation and 
cooperation borne by CCAMLR parties. Part IV briefly examines the principles 
governing extra-territorial jurisdiction in international law. Part V assesses the 
exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction on the high seas. Part VI discusses support for 
nationality jurisdiction in modern fisheries regulation. The paper concludes, in Part 
VII, by evaluating the practical operation of jurisdiction over nationals in the 
CCAMLR context. 
7 Lutgen, above, 401 , maintains that management of the Patagonian toothfish crisis stands as a test of 
CCAMLR's ability to conserve adequately the waters which it purports to govern. 
8 See ISOFISH Th e Vikings: Th e Involvement of Norwegian Fishermen in Illegal and Unregulated 
Long Line Fishing for Patagonian Toothfish in the Southern Ocean Occasional Report No (ISOFISH, 
Hobart, 3 October 1998) paragraph 1.5 . See also Beth C Clark and Alan D Hemmings, above, 10. 
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II THE ILLEGAL SOUTHERN OCEAN FISHERY 
Over-fishing is not a new phenomenon in the Southern Ocean. Invariably 
harvesting of Antarctic fish stocks has followed a pattern of "discovery, full scale 
exploitation and depletion, followed by a switch to other stocks or species."9 In the 
late nineteenth century hunters decimated stocks of pelagic seals and whales. 10 In the 
1960s large scale catches of Antarctic finfish around South Georgia brought about the 
collapse of those fisheries. 11 Finfish were aggressively targeted across the Southern 
Ocean in the 1970s and 1980s. 12 With the exhaustion of many other species, 
Patagonian toothfish emerged as the next target. 13 
IUU fishing of Patagonian toothfish began in the south-west Atlantic Ocean off 
the coast of Argentina and the Falkland/Malvina Islands in 1994. During the 1996 
and 1997 seasons, fishing efforts were directed increasingly further east. The catch 
area extended to South Georgia, Bouvet Island, Prince Edward, Crozet, Marion, 
Kergulen, and the Heard, and the McDonald and Macquarie Islands. 14 The fishery is 
now concentrated in the southern reaches of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Stocks 
show signs of being over-fished in all areas where they have been targeted and have 
reached commercial extinction in many. 15 
9 Erik Jaap Molenaar, "Southern Ocean Fisheries and the CCAMLR Regime" in Alex G Oude Elferink 
and Donald R Rothwell (eds) The Law of the Sea and Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Kluwer 
Law International, Great Britain, 2001) 293, 293 . 
10 See GE Fogg, A History of Antarctic Science (Cambridge, University Press, 1992) 38-40. See also 
ISOFISH Report No 3, above, paragraph 1.5. 
11 See Karl-Herman Kock, Antarctic Fish and Fisheries (Cambridge, University Press, 1992) 183-89. 
12 ISOFISH The Involvement of Mauritius in the Trade of Patagonian Toothfish from Illegal and 
Unregulated Long Line Fishing in the Southern Ocean and What Might be Done About It Occasional 
Report No 1 (ISOFISH, Hobart, August 1998) 5. 
13 The scientific name of Patagonian toothfish is Dissostichus eleginoides. In its markets it is known as 
Mero, Sea Bass, Chilean Sea Bass, Merlusa Nigra, Butterfish, Robalo, and Back Hake. See M Lack 
and G Sant Patagonian Toothfish : Are Conservation Measures Working (2001) Offprint from Traffic 
Bulletin 19( 1 ), 11. 
14 See map of the CCAMLR Area in Annex II of this paper. 
15 For example, the toothfish fishery around Prince Edward and Marion Islands reached commercial 
extinction after only two years of fishing. See ASOC ECO 2 paper informally circulated at CCAMLR 
XVIII (Hobart, October 2 1999). 
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The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources 
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was 
negotiated in the 1970s with the aim of securing protection of the fragile ecosystem of 
the Southern Antarctic Ocean. 16 The original 22 parties were brought to the 
negotiating table out of a concern that a lack of management in the past had been 
responsible for the wholesale destruction of Antarctic resources. Their concern was 
galvanised by recognition of the need to prevent over-exploitation of krill so as to 
avoid the adverse effects that this would have on the Antarctic ecosystem as a whole. 17 
The Convention was eventually concluded on 20 May 1980. 18 
The regulatory area of the Convention encompasses all high seas ocean south of 
60° South latitude and all Antarctic marine living resources of the area between that 
latitude and the Antarctic Convergence. 19 The Convention's objective, set out in 
Article II, is "conservation of Antarctic marine living resources". The term 
"conservation" therein "includes rational use". Article II further lists the three 
principles of conservation that should be observed for harvesting and other activities 
in the CCAMLR Area.20 Their cumulative meaning clearly demonstrates the original 
16 See David Edwards & John A. Heap, "Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources: A Commentary," (1981) 20 Polar Record 353, 354-56 
17 See John A Heap "Has CCAMLR Worked? Management Policies and Ecological Needs" in The 
Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics (Amfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng eds, St Martins 
Press, New York, 1991) 43 , 43-49 . An additional incentive also came from the increasing likelihood of 
United Nations involvement in regulating the Antarctic marine environment, something the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties were committed to avoiding. See Fernando Zegers "The Canberra 
Convention: Objectives and Political Aspects of its Negotiation, in Antarctic Resources Policy" in 
Francisco Orrego Vicuna ( ed) Antarctic Resources: Policy Scientific, Legal and Political Issues 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 1983) 149,152. 
18 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (20 May 1980) 1329 UNTS 
47; NZTS 1981, No 12; ATS 1982 No 9; UKTS 1982 No 48; CTS 1988 No 37. Current Contracting 
Parties are listed in Annex I of this paper. 
19 Article 1(1) . The Antarctic Convergence is a clear divide where cold Antarctic waters are sub-ducted 
beneath warmer more northerly waters forming a natural barrier that separates Antarctic and sub-
Antarctic species from fauna in more temperate waters. See Stuart B Kaye "Legal Approaches to Polar 
Fisheries Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources and the Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention" (1995) 26 Case W Res Int'l 
LJ 75, 82-3. 
20 The three principles are: (a) prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to levels 
below those which ensure its stable recruitment, that is, a level close to that which ensures the greatest 
net annual increment; (b) maintenance of the ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and 
related populations of Antarctic marine living resources and the restoration of depleted populations to 
the levels defined in sub-paragraph (a) above; and (c) prevention of changes or minimization of the risk 
of changes in the marine ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades, 
taking into account the State of available knowledge of the direct and indirect impact of harvesting, the 
effect of the introduction of alien species, the effects of associated activities on the marine ecosystem 
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Parties' intention to put the welfare of the area's marine eco-system to the fore of 
decisions concerning activities under the Convention.21 
To meet this objective, the Convention's Contracting Parties established a 
Commission empowered to designate protected species, to set harvesting quotas, 
seasons, and methods and to direct the undertaking, compilation and dissemination of 
research.22 The decisions of the Commission are recorded as Conservation Measures 
and Resolutions. Conservation Measures form the principal means by which the 
Commission regulates members' access to the marine living resources within its 
jurisdiction. 23 
Enforcement of these measures takes place in accordance with an arrangement 
for the boarding and inspection of CCAMLR flag vessels by inspectors designated by 
Commission members. The scheme requires reports to be prepared for both the 
Commission and the flag State by the authorities of the inspecting State. The flag 
State is then obliged to investigate and, as appropriate, prosecute and impose 
sanctions for violations, and report back to the Commission steps so taken. 
CCAMLR's Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection (SCOI) reviews 
members' reports on their enforcement of the Conservation Measures and passes these 
to the annual Commission meeting for review. 24 
Although theoretically efficacious, in practice this flag-State-based system has 
not equipped CCAMLR to control harvesting of Patagonian toothfish by non-member 
flagged vessels. The Commission's control over Patagonian toothfish fishing was 
increasingly marginalised over the course of the 1990s. By the middle of that decade, 
NGOs claimed the organisation had fast lost efficacy in the face of a "massive 
and of the effects of environmental changes, with the aim of making possible the sustained conservation 
of Antarctic marine living resources . 
21 This, pioneering, eco-system approach is evident in the Convention's adherence to multi-species 
management. See Erik Jaap Molenaar, "Southern Ocean Fisheries and the CCAMLR Regime" in Alex 
G Oude Elferink and Donald R Rothwell (eds) The Law of the Sea and Maritime Delimitation and 
Jurisdiction (Kluwer Law International, Great Britain, 2001) 293-318, 294. 
22 Article IX(l)(a), (b) and (c). 
23 Article IX(2). 
24 Text of the CCAMLR System oflnspection Basic Documents (7th ed, CCAMLR, Hobart, 1995) 
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breakout of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing."
25 At its 181h meeting, 
CCAMLR itself admitted the possibility of the long term yield of the stock being 
compromised in the future by its "ineffective control" of the illegal fishery.
26 
Scientists contemporaneously predicted the commercial extinction of the entire fishery 
in only two years. 27 At CCAMLR XIX, the Commission recorded that the level of 
IUU fishing in the Convention Area "continued to be unacceptable."
28 The illegal 
fishery was also a primary preoccupation of the CCAMLR XX SCOI, Commission 
and Scientific Committee meetings. 29 
IUU Fislti1tg in the CCAMLR Area 
The term 'IUU' fishing describes collectively a range of unlawful activities. 
'Illegal' fishing refers to activities conducted in waters under the jurisdiction of a 
State, without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and 
regulations. The term encompasses fishing by vessels of States that are party to a 
fisheries management organisation (FMO) in violation of that organisation's agreed 
management rules. 30 In the CCAMLR context, the term describes vessels fishing 
without permits within the exclusive economic zones of the sub-Antarctic islands of 
undisputed sovereignty. 31 
25 ISOFISH The Involvement of Mauritius in the Trade of Patagonian Toothfish from fllegal and 
Unregulated Long Line Fishing in the Southern Ocean and What Might be Done About ft Occasional 
Report No 1 (ISOFISH, Hobart, August 1998), 5. 
26 Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1998) paragraph 5.5 
27 Ian J Popick "Are There Really Plenty of Fish in the Sea? The World Trade Organisation's Presence 
is Effectively Frustrating the International Community's Attempts to Conserve Chilean Sea Bass" 
(2001) 50 Emory LJ 939, 943. 
28 Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 2000) paragraph 5.5 
29 See Report of the Twentieth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 2001) paragraphs 5.1-
5.43. 
30 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (IPOA) <http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/x6729e/x6700.htm> (last accessed 3 February 
2002) paragraph 3 .1. 
31 The maritime zones declared around a number of sub-Antarctic islands not subject to sovereignty 
disputes are included in the CCAMLR Area; namely Heard and McDonald Islands (Australia), 
Kergulen and Crozet Islands (France), Bouvetoya Island (Norway), Prince Edward and Marion Islands 
(South Africa), and South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and Shag Rocks (claimed by both 
Argentina and the United Kingdom but in the 'effective control' of the latter). Even though 
conservation measures may apply within their maritime zones, Article IV(2)(b) and (c) of the 
Convention preserves these States' competence to regulate access and revenues. See Erik Jaap 
Molenaar, "Southern Ocean Fisheries and the CCAMLR Regime" in Alex G Oude Elferink and Donald 
R Rothwell (eds) The law of the Sea and Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Kluwer Law 
International, Great Britain, 2001) 293, 302. 
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'Unreported' fishing refers to fishing activities which have not been accurately 
reported to the relevant national authority or FMO in contravention of national laws or 
FMO reporting procedures.32 The concept encompasses the disposal of catch in a 
manner designed to avoid reporting catch data to the competent authority. 33 In the 
CCAMLR context, the term is used to describe Party flagged vessels, otherwise acting 
in compliance with CCAMLR regulations, concealing the fact of exceeding their total 
allowable catch, and thus undermining the reliability of stock assessments and 
scientific understanding of the fishery. 34 
'Unregulated' fishing refers to fishing activities in the area governed by a FMO 
conducted by vessels flying the flag of a State not party to that organisation. 
Unregulated fishing takes place in contravention of the conservation and management 
measures of the relevant FMO. In relation to areas for which there are no applicable 
conservation or management measures, the term describes fishing in a manner 
inconsistent with States' responsibilities under intemational law.35 CCAMLR uses the 
term to describe fishing by vessels flagged to non-member States within the 
CCAMLR area in defiance of the quotas and fisheries rules which it has established. 
According to CCAMLR estimates, IUU fishing of Patagonian toothfish 
represented 49 per cent of the total estimated catch over the 1996-2001 period, 
32 IPOA, above, paragraph 3.2. 
33 John Fitzpatrick, "Measures to Enhance the Capability of Flag State to Exercise Effective Control 
Over a Fishing Vessel" Paper presented to the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing organised by the Government of Australia in cooperation with the FAO (Sydney, 
15-19 May 2000). 
34 David J Bederman "CCAMLR in Crisis: A Case Study of Marine Management in the Southern 
Oceans" in HN Scheiber (ed) The Law of the Sea (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000) 169, 
176. 
35 IPOA, above, paragraph 3.3. 
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including 32 per cent in 1999-2000, and 39 per cent in 2000-2001.36 NGOs give even 
higher estimates of IUU fishing than those produced by CCAMLR. 37 
While IUU activity appears to have reduced from the initial plunder of the mid-
1990s, it remains a serious problem. Compared with other fisheries, the annual 
aggregated catch of Patagonian toothfish in the CCAMLR Area is significant in 
neither quantity nor in value.38 However, there is little doubt that IUU activity has 
grave implications for the future of the fish stock and its eco-system. 39 It also tempers 
the willingness of member States to agree on management measures which bind 
themselves but impose no constraints on the illegal fishing industry.40 
Part of the problem rests with the Commission's institutional inadequacies. 
CCAMLR operates by consensus decision-making and it is open to its members to 
refuse to be bound by decisions to which they explicitly object. 41 Moreover, the 
36 CCAMLR estimates for the 1997-2000 period were; 1996/7- 68234 tonnes of 100970 tonnes caught; 
1997/8- 26829 tonnes of 54967 tonnes caught; 1998/9- 6636 tonnes of 53955 tonnes caught; 
1999/2000- 8418 tonnes of33660 tonnes caught. See CCAMLR Report of the Working Group on Fish 
Stock Assessment Annex V in the Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, 
Hobart, 1998), CCAMLR Report of the Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment Annex V in the 
Report of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1999), CCAMLR Report of 
the Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment Annex V in the Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of the 
Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1999), Statistical Bulletin Volume 12 (CCAMLR, Hobart, 2000) and 
Report of the Twentieth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 2001) paragraph 5.3. 
37 NGO commentators dispute the accuracy of CCAMLR's estimates and question CCAMLR's 
assertion that total catch of Patagonian toothfish declined over the 1997-2000 period, suggesting that a 
more likely explanation for the decline in the CCAMLR estimates of IUU fishing lies in the short 
comings of the estimates themselves. NGO analysis of recorded catch and trade data for 2000 suggests 
that IUU catch comprised around 57 per cent of the total trade in that year and was four times greater 
than the CCAMLR estimate of IUU landings of Patagonian toothfish. See M Lack and G Sant 
Patagonian Toothfish: Are Conservation Measures Working Offprint from Traffic Bulletin 
19(1)(Traffic International, Cambridge, 2001) 7-9. 
38 Erik Jaap Molenaar, "Southern Ocean Fisheries and the CCAMLR Regime" in Alex G Oude Elferink 
and Donald R Rothwell (eds) The Law of the Sea and Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Kluwer 
Law International, Great Britain, 2001) 293, 307-8 . 
39 At its 2000 meeting, CCAMLR's Scientific Committee estimated total incidental mortality of 
albatrosses and other seabirds (which dive on the baited hooks of longlining fishing boats as they are 
being set) because IUU fishers do not use the mitigation methods developed by CCAMLR from pirate 
fishing in the Convention area at between 105900 and 257000 birds over the preceding four years, a 
level of depredation which was "completely unsustainable for the species and populations concerned". 
See Beth C Clark and Alan D Hemmings "Problems and Prospects for CCAMLR Twenty Years On" 
(2001) 4 Journal oflnternational Wildlife Law and Policy 1, 4 . 
40 Gail Lutgen "The Rise and Fall of the Patagonian Toothfish: Food for Thought" (1997) 27 Envl Pol 
& Law 401,401. 
41 Article XII. 
I 
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Commission has no independent means to acquire and develop the scientific data on 
which its decisions are based.42 
CCAMLR's greatest disadvantage, however, is the absence of any means to 
enforce conservation measures against either Parties or non-Parties.
43 Violation of 
conservation measures is hard to detect. The vastness of the CCAMLR Area, the 
rigours of climate, and the absence of nearby populated settlements makes for difficult 
and costly surveillance.44 Even when it does establish that infractions have taken 
place, the Commission can merely "draw to the attention" of States activities which 
undermine the principles of the Convention, or adversely affect its implementation.
45 
Effectively, with respect to both Parties and non-Parties, "the only weapon at the 
Commission's disposal is the embarrassment of being publicly seen as a State lacking 
an environmental conscience. "46 
Contracting Party Links with the Illegal Fishery 
It is often the case that participants in fisheries management regimes may be 
involved simultaneously in the IUU fishery. Their involvement may not be confined 
to vessels flying their flag, but may include allowing use of their ports for landings of 
IUU catch; permitting the import, processing, sale or export of IUU caught fish; or 
tolerating ownership or operation of IUU vessels or participation in the trade or 
processing of IUU catch by their nationals and registered companies.
47 The 
experience of CCAMLR has generated allegations that member State nationals and 
42 NGOs suggest the Scientific Committee has been hampered by inadequate and incomplete 
submission of data by those exploiting the resources . See Clarke and Hemmings, above, 4. See also Ian 
J Popick "Are There Really Plenty of Fish in the Sea? The World Trade Organisation's Presence is 
Effectively Frustrating the International Community's Attempts to Conserve Chilean Sea Bass" (2001) 
50 Emory LJ 939, 966-67. 
43 David J Bedemian "CCAMLR in Crisis: A Case Study of Marine Management in the Southern 
Oceans" in H N Scheiber ( ed) The Law of the Sea (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000) 169, 
172-3. 
44 Richard Herr "The International Regulation of Patagonian Toothfish: CCAMLR and High Seas 
Fisheries Management" in Olav Schram Stokke (ed) Governing High Seas Fisheries Management: The 
Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford, University Press, 2001) 303, 314. 
45 Article X. 
46 Stuart B Kaye, "Legal Approaches to Polar Fisheries Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the Bering Sea Doughnut 
Hole Convention" (1995) 26 Case W Res Int'I LJ 75 , 85. 
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companies, ports and markets all share responsibility for IUU fishing in the CCAMLR 
Area.48 
As in many over harvested fisheries, there is m CCAMLR a perception that 
fishing in contravention of international conservation and management measure by 
vessels flying non-member 'flags of convenience' is a primary cause of the stock's 
depletion. 49 Technically characterised as "unregulated" fishing, this type of illegal 
activity poses a great challenge to CCAMLR because of the negative signals sent to 
third parties by member States' failure to keep even their own vessels from side-
stepping its regulatory framework. 50 
A sizeable proportion of the illegal Patagonian toothfish fleet is owned and 
operated by member State nationals flying the flags of non Parties to the CCAMLR 
Convention such as Belize, Panama, Namibia and Vanuatu. The flags of the Faeroe 
Islands, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Portugal, the 
Seychelles, and Taiwan have also been used, although in smaller numbers. 51 NGOs 
have identified Spanish and Norwegian, and to a lesser extent South African, 
Argentinean, Chilean and United States interests as the beneficial owners of many 
such vessels. Spanish and Norwegian nationals have been identified as IUU vessel 
masters. 52 NGO reports have also implicated Namibian and Uruguyan ports and 
Chilean and Japanese markets in the IUU fishery. 53 
47 Erik Jaap Molenaar, "Southern Ocean Fisheries and the CCAMLR Regime" in Alex G Oude Elferink 
and Donald R Rothwell (eds) The Law of the Sea and Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Kluwer 
Law International, Great Britain, 2001) 293, 307. 
48 Molenaar, above, 307. 
49 Gail Lutgen, ''The Rise and Fall of the Patagonian Toothfish: Food for Thought" (1997) 27 Envl Pol 
& Law 401,403. 
50 The phenomena of open registries, which offer such flags, is discussed further in Part V of this paper. 
51 David Vidas "Emerging Law on the Sea issues in the Antarctic Maritime Area: A Heritage for the 
New Century" (2000) 31 Ocean Dev and Int'l Law 197, 201. 
52 ISOFISH The Vikings: The Involvement of Norwegian Fishermen in Illegal and Unregulated Long 
Line Fishing for Patagonian Toothfish in the Southern Ocean Occasional Report No 3 (ISOFISH, 
Hobart, October 1988) names specific Norwegian vessels and companies, some of which were 
identified as being registered in Argentina, Panama and the Cayman Islands. See also ISOFISH The 
Chilean Fishing Industry: Its Involvement in and Connections to the !llegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Exploitation of Patagonian Toothfish in the Southern Ocean Occasional Report No 2 
(ISOFISH, Hobart, March 1999) and Lutgen, above, 403. 
53 See M Lack and G Sant Patagonian Toothfish: Are Conservation Measures Working Offprint from 
Traffic Bulletin 19(1) 9 and ASOC (Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition) "Southern Ocean 
Goldrush" (1997) The Antarctic Project 6(2) 3. See also ISOFISH The Involvement of Mauritius in the 
Trade of Patagonian Toothfish from !llegal and Unregulated Long Line Fishing in the Southern 
Ocean and What Might be Done About ft Occasional Report No 1 (ISOFISH, Hobart, August 1998) 
• • • • 
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Although the scale and magnitude of IUU fishing for Patagonian toothfish is 
well-known, the detailed operation of the illegal fishery is obscured not only by the 
fact the vessels involved frequently countries of registration, but also by the use of 
shell corporations to obscure the beneficial interests of these ships.54 NGOs have 
publicised examples of Spanish controlled vessels transferred to Belize, Mauritius and 
Chilean registered front companies and the operation of front Norwegian companies 
in Panama, Argentina, the Cayman Islands and Hong Kong. 55 
CCAMLR 's efforts to deal with IUU Fishing by refl.agged vessels 
By the mid 1990s CCAMLR was well aware of the peril it faced in the form of 
IUU fishing.56 The need to combat illegal fishing and trade by member State nationals 
using vessels flagged to non-parties was also evident to a number of CCAMLR 
members. 57 
CCAMLR has responded to this unregulated fishing with a number of 
conservation measures and resolutions. Conservation Measure 147/XIX provides that 
non-Party flagged vessels sited engaged in fishing in CCAMLR Area are to be 
presumed to be undermining the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures 
and thus subjected to stringent port State inspections. 58 Non-Contracting Party 
vessels entering the ports of Contracting Parties must be inspected. Landings and 
transshipments by those vessels are prohibited where it cannot be established that the 
vessels' catch was taken in compliance with CCAMLR's conservation measures.59 
Resolution 13/XIX calls upon States to avoid reflagging or licensing any vessel with 
Southern Ocean IUU history. Further, CCAMLR XX set in place a regime for 
54 ISOFISH Toothfish Poachers Changing Vessel Names in an Attempt to Avoid Identification by the 
CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme Report No 4 (ISOFISH, Hobart May 2000). See also David 
Vidas "Emerging Law on the Sea issues in the Antarctic Maritime Area: A Heritage for the New 
Century" (2000) 31 Ocean Dev and Int'l Law 197,204. 
55 See ISOFISH Occasional Report No l above and Report No 4 above. See also Report of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations A/53/473 (United Nations, New York, 1998) paragraph 147. 
56 See Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1997) 152. 
57 See Penelope Ridings "Compliance, Enforcement and the Southern Oceans: The Need for a New 
Approach" in RA Herr (ed) Sovereignty at Sea: From Westphalia to Madrid (Wollongong Papers on 
Maritime Policy No 11, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 2000) 175. 
58 Conservation Measure 147/XIX Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, 
Hobart, 2000) Annex 6. 
59 Conservation Measure 118/XVII Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, 
Hobart, 1998) Annex 6. 
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identification of the flag States of non-complying non-Party vessels as States 
unwilling to exercise their flag State obligations. This initiative was intended to lay 
the foundation for the Commission later to take multilateral trade related measures 
and other sanctions against States so identified.60 
As an incentive to compliance, the Commission routinely invites non-Parties 
involved in IUU fishing to attend Commission Meetings as observers, to accede to the 
Convention and to become Members of the Commission. It also invites non-Parties to 
participate in specific Conservation Measures. 6 1 
The Limitations of the Flag State Approach 
CCAMLR's outreach has had some success in bringing outsiders within the 
fold. 62 Yet, bolstered by powerful foreign-controlled fishing interests, many non-
Parties have proved difficult to persuade. On the other hand, however, reliance on 
flag States to sanction transgressions is thought by some to have exacerbated the IUU 
problem.63 Critics claim the practice of reflagging of vessels from member to non-
member registries has removed the effective relationship between flag States and 
vessels on which CCAMLR's compliance and enforcement system is based.64 
CCAMLR's reporting requirements assist to identify the involvement in 
incidents of non-compliance by member State nationals. However, CCAMLR has 
been thwarted by the fact that few States have any appropriate mechanism in place to 
respond to such information. Poachers are able to carry out their activities because the 
fishing States where they live and work have no domestic legislation capable of 
applying sanctions to their nationals and residents for fishing offences committed 
6° Conservation Measure 118/XX Report of the Twentieth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, 
Hobart, 2001) Annex 10. 
6 1 See, for example, the Catch Documentation Scheme established by Conservation Measure 170/XIX 
and Resolution 16/XIX in Report of the Nin eteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 
2000) Annex 6. 
62 For example, the Commission welcomed the accession of Namibia at CCAMLR XIX. See Report of 
the Nineteenth Meeting of the Commission, above, Annex 5 paragraphs 2.49-2 .50. 
63 See "Further Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Convention 
Area" paper presented by the New Zealand delegation to CCAMLR XVII (Hobart, October 1998) 
published in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Commission for the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources CCAMLR XV!f: Hobart 26 October - 6 November 
1998: Report of the New Zealand Delegation (Wellington, 1998) Annex E. 
I • 
I • 
17 
outside their own exclusive economic zones.65 Consequently, neither CCAMLR's 
enforcement system nor its scheme to promote non-Party cooperation has had the 
desired deterrent effect. 66 
Alternative Approaches 
Ineffective reliance on national authorities to control their own flag vessels has 
prompted some coastal States in the CCAMLR Area, namely France, Australia and 
South Africa, to take steps individually to enforce their own fisheries regulations. 
Such efforts have met with a degree of success, 67 but the magnitude of IUU fishing in 
the CCAMLR area is too great to rely upon coastal State enforcement alone. This is 
especially so given that the coverage of such jurisdiction falls well short of the area of 
illegal fishing, and even its existence may be subject to dispute. 68 Port State 
jurisdiction has increasing currency, as envisaged by Conservation Measure 147/XIX. 
However, in the CCAMLR context, its application is limited as it depends upon the 
offending vessel calling voluntarily in a Member State port, rather than the more usual 
non Party 'ports of convenience' .69 
The demonstrated limitations of flag, coastal and port State jurisdiction demand 
that CCAMLR take a new approach to the issue of compliance and enforcement. 
Effective control of illegal fishing must include direct confrontation of Party State 
nationals who use the reflagging mechanism to circumvent conservation and 
64 Beth C Clark and Alan D Hemmings "Problems and Prospects for CCAMLR Twenty Years On" 
(2001) 4 Journal oflntemational Wildlife Law and Policy I, 4. 
65 ISOFISH The Vikings: Th e Involvement of Norwegian Fishermen in Illegal and Unregulated Long 
Line Fishing for Patagonian Toothfish in the South ern Ocean Occasional Report No 3 (ISOFISH, 
Hobart, 1998), paragraph 6.2. 
66 Penelope Ridings "Compliance, Enforcement and the Southern Oceans: The Need for a New 
Approach" in RA Herr (ed) Sovereignty at Sea: From Westphalia to Madrid (Wollongong Papers on 
Maritime Policy No 11 , Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 2000) 175, 182. 
67 See, for example, details of subsequent coastal State prosecutions outlined in the "Report of the 
Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection" in Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the 
Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1998) Annex 5 paragraph 2.8 and I the "Report of the Standing 
Committee on Observation and Inspection" in Report of the Twentieth Meeting of the Commission 
(CCAMLR, Hobart, 2001) Annex 5 paragraphs 2.2, 2.15 and 2.24. 
68 In Antarctica, coastal State jurisdiction is universally recognised only in respect of sub-Antarctic 
islands set out in n3 l above. Recognition allows the States to which the islands belong to promulgate 
their own conservation measures. However not all stocks of Patagonian toothfish fall within the 
jurisdiction of a coastal State. Port State jurisdiction also has a very limited application as it depends on 
the offending vessel being voluntarily within port. See Ridings, above, 181-182. 
69 See discussion at 14 above. 
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management obligations with would otherwise be opposable to them. 70 It is submitted 
that this form of control may be achieved, at least partly, by obligating CCAMLR's 
member States to exercise jurisdiction based on the nationality of the IUU vessel's 
owner, operator, master and/or crew to combat the illegal fishery. 
A 'Nationals' initiative 
In 1998 New Zealand put to the SCOI meeting a draft Conservation Measure 
which included a proposal that the Commission formalise an obligation on 
Contracting Parties to ensure that not only their flag vessels, but also their nationals 
and all companies established in and subject to their jurisdiction, comply with the 
CCAMLR conservation measures to which that Party was bound. The paper proposed 
that Parties would make the contravention of a CCAMLR conservation measures an 
offence under their national legislation. Contracting Parties would assist each other in 
identifying vessels and their masters, owners or operators reported to have engaged in 
activities undermining the effectiveness of CCAMLR Conservation Measures. 71 
The proposal met surprising resistance. 72 Some parties rallied in defence of "the 
sacrosanct Flag-State principle and the principle of not giving laws extra-territorial 
application."73 In the Commission meeting, when the proposal arose, a Norwegian 
delegate pronounced that: 74 
70 David F Matlin "Re-evaluating the Status of Flags of Convenience Under International Law" ( 1991) 
23 Vand J Transnat'l L 1017, 1055. 
71 See "Further Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Convention 
Area" paper presented by the New Zealand delegation to CCAMLR XVII (Hobart, October 1998) 
published in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Commission for the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources CCAMLR XVI!: Hobart 26 October - 6 November 
1998: Report of the New Zealand Delegation (Wellington, 1998) Annex E. 
72 See CCAMLR "Report of the Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection" in Report of the 
Seventeenth Meeting of the Commission {CCAMLR, Hobart, 1998) Annex V paragraphs 2.41-3. See 
also Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Commission for the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources CCAMLR XVI!: Hobart 26 October - 6 November 1998: Report of 
the New Zealand Delegation (Wellington, 1998) 19. 
73 Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1998) paragraph 5.8. 
Prior to the CCAMLR Meeting, the EC and France expressed reservations about the inconsistency of 
the nationals proposal with flag State jurisdiction. The EC also cited the difficulty of penetrating 
complex corporate structures to identify controlling interests and the impossibility of assuming 
responsibility for nationals' actions in light of Community Members' inability to restrict the nationality 
of those employed on its vessels, and thus to monitor the vessels on which its nationals might be 
employed. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Internal Reports "Antarctic Fisheries: CCAMLR: 
Enforcement and Compliance" C05506/BRU 10 September 1998 and "Antarctic Fisheries: CCAMLR 
Enforcement & Compliance" C06045/PAR 10 September 1998. 
74 CCAMLR Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Commission, above, paragraph 5.8. 
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These principles have, so to speak, been pillars of marine resource management both in 
CCAMLR and other international marine management organisations. In the Norwegian 
view, the Flag-State principle - i.e. that the responsibility resides with the Flag State -
should continue as the basis of regulatory measures. We should therefore stop short of 
measures undermining the Flag-State principle. Likewise we should tread cautiously when 
approaching questions of extra-territoriality. 
As a consequence of such misgivings CCAMLR's consensus decision making 
norm ensured that the proposal ultimately foundered. 75 Technically the New Zealand 
paper remains on the table and may be further reconsidered if the SCOI or the 
Commission choose to revisit the nationals issue in the future. Developments in 
fisheries management, which have taken place since the proposal was last made, 
suggest that the above objections would resonate less powerfully if the initiative were 
raised again. 
75 Chile and South Africa both endorsed the need for new enforcement initiatives. CCAMLR Report of 
the Seventeenth Meeting of the Commission, above, paragraphs 5.10 and 5.11. 
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III HIGH SEAS CONSERVATION OBLIGATIONS 
In addition to signaling the full commitment of its members to the principles on 
which the Convention is based, incorporation of a nationals approach would 
demonstrate CCAMLR's compliance with recognised conservation and cooperation 
duties and developing environmental protectionist norms. In recent years international 
instruments have further developed understanding of States' obligations to protect the 
marine environment and the viability of fish stocks therein. These understandings 
point to a responsibility on the part of CCAMLR Parties to avail themselves of all 
means open to them to prevent the annihilation of fish stocks, such as the Patagonian 
toothfish. Contemporary international agreements posit that obligation as a condition 
of high seas fishing access. 
Freedom of Fishing 
As early as the seventeenth century, freedom of the high seas was seen by some 
as a fundamental principle of international law.76 The contemporary reStatement of 
this - now universally recognised - freedom can be found in Article 87 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982.77 That provision 
stipulates that the high seas is open to both coastal and land locked States for 
navigation, over-flight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, the construction 
of artificial islands and other installations, scientific research, and fishing. 
These high seas freedoms are not unqualified, however. Article 87 provides that 
their exercise is subject to the rules of international law, including UNCLOS itself, 
and is conditional on due regard for the interests of other States and their right to 
exercise the same freedoms. Accordingly, as the common property of all States, high 
76 In the seventeenth century, Spain and Portugal claimed large parts of the high seas as part of their 
respective territories . In response, Hugo Grotius, counsel to the Dutch East India Company, developed 
his now famous theory that the sea was by nature free from the sovereignty of any State, because it 
could not be taken into possession through occupation. Freedom of the high seas so expressed was 
eventually reflected in both customary international law and relevant treaty instruments. See Sir Robert 
Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds) Oppenheim 's International Law Voll (9th ed, Longman, Harlow 
Essex, 1992) 721. See also MN Shaw International Law (Grotius Publications Ltd, Cambridge, 1991) 
337 and Brian D Smith State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1988) 185. 
77 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (10 December 1982) 21 ILM 1261 1982; NZTS 
1996 No 14. 
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seas fish stocks may be harvested. However, they may be fished only with due regard 
for other State's rights to access to the same stocks. 
The collective nature of States' interests in high seas fisheries is expanded by 
subsequent UNCLOS articles. Article 116 makes clear that all States share an interest 
in conserving marine living resources. 78 Recognition of the duty to conserve such 
resources serves as a fundamental limitation on the freedom of the high seas, the 
substance of which is further elucidated in Articles 117-119.79 
Duties to Conserve and Cooperate 
Article 117 of UNCLOS imposes a duty on all States to take, or to cooperate 
with other States in taking, such measures for their own nationals "as may be 
necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high sea". 80 Article 118 
sets out the obligation on States to cooperate in the conservation and management of 
living resources on the high seas inter alia through the establishment of regional 
fisheries organisations and, by implication, by cooperative participation in them. 81 
Article 119 requires States to ensure that decisions concerning the allowable catch and 
necessary conservation measures for the living resources of the high seas are based on 
the best scientific evidence available.82 
The combined effect of these provisions is the conservation measures taken by 
States in accordance with Article 119 should be the result of the cooperation provided 
for in Article 118. The articles reveal that implementation of conservation measures 
78 The duty to conserve is first mentioned in Article 62(1) of UNCLOS, in relation to coastal State's 
obligations toward their EEZs. Therein it is qualified by a corresponding duty of optimal utilisation 
(maximum sustainable yield) to be determined by scientific calculation as well as factors including the 
economic needs of coastal fishers and special requirements of developing States. See Sean Hem 
"Competing Values: Taking a Broad View on the Narrowing Conservation Regime of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" (2000) 16 Am U Int'l L Rev 177, 180 . 
79 The qualifications referred to in Article 87 of UNCLOS have their roots in the 1958 Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, the 1958 Convention on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 
and the earlier work done on drafts of those conventions by the International Law Commission. See 
United Nations Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1955 Volume I: Summary records of 
the seventh session (United Nations, New York, 1960). 
80 The meaning of nationals in this context is subject to some debate and will be discussed further in 
Part V of this paper. 
81 See Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs (DOLAS) The Law of 
the Sea: Regime for High Seas Fisheries: Status and Prospects (United Nations, New York, 1992) 10. 
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for high seas fish stocks was designed to be a cooperative activity. States are required 
by Article 117 to individually apply to their nationals those conservation measures 
determined in cooperation with other States. 83 
Elaboration of High Seas Obligations 
The conservation and cooperation duties set out in UNCLOS are described only 
broadly. Multilateral fisheries management arrangements negotiated in recent years 
have given them more precise definition. 
The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 1993 (Compliance 
Agreement)84 builds on the cooperation obligation in UNCLOS described above by 
unequivocally identifying signatories ' fundamental responsibility to ensure that their 
vessels do not undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and 
management regimes. They must prevent their vessels from fishing on the high seas 
unless they have been authorised to do so. They must ensure that they can exercise 
effective control over those vessels before issuing such authorisation.85 Although the 
Compliance Agreement is primarily focused on flag State obligations, both its tone 
and content illustrate the international community's expectation that the conservation 
and management of high seas fish stocks is to be secured by positive action on the part 
of States. 
The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries86 is a voluntary arrangement 
which establishes principles to be implemented in order to exercise control over 
fishing vessels wherever they may be. It calls upon users of marine living resources to 
conserve marine eco-systems, and couples the right to fish with an obligation to do so 
82 Article 119 further stipulates that such measures shall be designed to maintain or restore populations 
of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by 
relevant environmental and economic factors. 
83 See DOLAS, above, 9-11 and 25-29. 
84 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 1993, United Nations Department of Oceans and Law of the Sea and 
Food and Agriculture Organisation International Fisheries Instruments (United Nations, New York, 
1998) 41-50. 
85 Although the Agreement has yet to enter into force many nations have begun voluntarily applying its 
principles. See Deirdre M Warner-Kramer and Krista Canty "Stateless Fishing Vessels: The Current 
International Regime and a New Approach" (2000) Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 227, 232-233 . 
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in a manner consistent with the effective conservation and management of the living 
resources. 87 Specifically, States are urged: 
• to facilitate the sustained recovery of resources which have been adversely 
affected by fishing or other human activities;88 
• as participants in regional fisheries management organisations, to implement 
measures consistent with international law to deter activities of non-participant 
flagged vessels which undermine the effectiveness of conservation and 
management measures established by such organisations;89 
• to implement an effective domestic framework for fisheries resource conservation 
and fisheries management;90 and 
• to ensure that domestic laws and regulations provide for sanctions applicable in 
respect of violations which are adequate in severity to be effective. 91 
High seas conservation obligations were further developed by the negotiation of 
the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions for the United Nations Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1995 (Fish Stocks 
Agreement) which came into force in November 2001. 92 The Fish Stocks Agreement 
provides that States shall give effect to their UNCLOS duties by becoming members 
of fisheries management organisations (FMOs), or by agreeing to apply the 
conservation and management measures established by such organisations.93 The 
86 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (29 September 1995) United Nations Department of 
Oceans and Law of the Sea and Food and Agriculture Organisation, above, 56-80. 
87 Article 6.1 
88 Article 7.6.10 
89 Article 7.7.5 
90 Article 7.7.1 
91 Article 7.7.2 
92 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions for the United Nations Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks ( 4 December 1995), United Nations Department of Oceans and Law of the Sea 
and Food and Agriculture Organisation, above, 7-38. 
93 Currently there is insufficient scientific evidence to determine whether Patagonian toothfish should be 
regarded as one single (straddling) stock, or it is composed of several distinct stocks. See Erik Jaap 
Molenaar, "Southern Ocean Fisheries and the CCAMLR Regime" in Alex G Oude Elferink and Donald 
R Rothwell (eds) The law of the Sea and Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Kluwer Law 
International, Great Britain, 2001) 293, 298. CCAMLR's qualification as a regional fisheries 
management organisation for the purposes of the Fish Stocks regime is also subject to debate. See 
ASOC Report on the XI Vth Meeting of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine living 
Resources (ASOC, Auckland and Washington, 1995) 9. 
24 
Agreement provides that States fishing on the high seas must take measures to prevent 
or eliminate over-fishing.94 States' obligation to uphold conservation measures for 
high seas fish stocks is thus extended beyond its area of territorial jurisdiction. 
In fulfilling their obligation to cooperate through FMOs, States are required to 
ensure the full cooperation of their national agencies and industries in implementing 
the decisions of such organisations.
95 To bolster the authority of FMOs, the Fish 
Stocks Agreement provides that only those States which join or cooperate with the 
relevant organisation shall have access to the fisheries resource to which those 
measures apply.96 Importantly, it adds enforcement and sanctions provisions to the 
more general UNCLOS obligations. 
Environmental Protection Obligations 
The responsibility of CCAMLR Parties to utilise all means available to combat 
illegal fishing is further amplified by developing norms of environmental protection. 
Evidence of an emerging notion that the marine environment is fragile and its 
resources limited can be found in the routine incorporation of the environmental 
protection principles and the precautionary approach into new fisheries management 
arrangements.97 The ocean is viewed in a number of multilateral environmental 
arrangements as the common concern of all humanity, the preservation of which 
transcends national interests.98 In this context, over-fishing of Southern Ocean fish 
94 Article 5(h). 
95 Article 10( 1) . 
96 Article 8( 4). However, it must be noted that the scope of the Fish Stocks Agreement is limited by the 
pacta tertiis rule, as Stated in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Thus, 
if a State chooses not to become a party to the Agreement, it cannot be held to be in breach of the 
obligations therein. However, most non-Parties to regional fisheries agreements are bound by Articles 
64 and 116-119 of UNCLOS. See Kevin Bray "A Global Review of lllegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (IUU) Fishing" Paper presented to the Expert Consultation on lllegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing organised by the Governrnent of Australia in cooperation with the FAQ (Sydney, 
15-19 May 2000) AUS :IUU/2000/6. 
97 See Yann-Huei Song "The Eco-system Approach: New Departures for Land and Water: Concluding 
Perspectives on Ecosystem Management" (1997) 24 Ecology LQ 861, 863. 
98 For example, Agenda 21 (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (14 June 1992) 
<www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 51 /aconf15126-/annexl.htrn> (last accessed 3 February 2002) and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (June 5 1992) 31 ILM 818. See Emeka Duruigbo 
"Multinational Corporations and Compliance with International Regulations Relating to the Petroleum 
Industry" (2001) 7 Ann Surv Int'l & Comp L 101 , 145. See also David S Ardia "Does the Emperor 
Have No Clothes" Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the Marine Environment" (1998) 19 
Mich J Int'l L 497, 506. 
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stocks can be seen as a threat to the well-being of the international community as a 
whole. 99 CCAMLR Parties and non-Parties both, therefore, have an interest in 
managing harvesting of fish stocks and, as necessary, an obligation to contribute to 
efforts to mitigate the above mentioned threats. 100 
Preventative obligations toward the environment generally are recognised not 
only in the marine pollution context, but also in the realm of protection of 
biodiversity. UN CLOS provides for the protection of rare and fragile eco-systems and 
imposes a general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment. 101 The 
Convention on Biological Diversity imposes on States the responsibility to ensure 
activities under their control do not damage areas beyond their national jurisdiction. 102 
By implication, this injunction extends to the high seas, and the activities of a State's 
nationals thereon. 103 
Duty to conserve CCAMLR Fish Stocks 
CCAMLR's foundation upon eco-system wide management and its embodiment 
of the precautionary approach indicate a willingness on the part of its negotiators to 
accept obligations to prevent destruction of the marine environment. 104 The obligation 
to take preventative action inherent in those undertakings extends to actions needed to 
prevent damage to the marine environment by over-fishing. 
CCAMLR's own framework fits comfortably with the conservation, cooperation 
and environmental protection principles expanded in treaties of the last decade. 
Specifically, the Convention requires its signatories to take appropriate steps to ensure 
99 Elana Geddis States that in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v 
Japan (ITLOS, 27 August 1999 ILM 38(6) 1624) the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea 
"effectively recognised that a threat to the sustainability of a fish stock is a threat of harm to the marine 
environment itself." In so concluding, ITLOS not only relied on the rights of the parties, but also their 
obligation to prevent serious harm to the marine environment. Elana Geddis "Resource and 
Environment: International Environmental Law: Covering the Gaps for the 21 51 Century" Paper 
Presented to the ANZIL/ASIL Conference, 26-29 June 2000, Canberra and Sydney. 
100 Duruigbo, above, 145. 
101 Articles 194(5) and 192 respectively. 
102 Article 3. 
103 Cyrille De Klemm "Fisheries Management and Marine Biological Diversity" in Ellen Hey (ed) 
Developments in International Fisheries Law (Kluwer, The Netherlands, 1999) 423,440. 104 Parties have accepted binding conservation measures relating to regulation of krill harvests to 
preserve the food supply of other species, seeking to eliminate incidental mortality of seabirds as a 
result of long Line Fishing and dumping of plastic and other waste. See De Klemm, above, 458 . 
26 
compliance with its prov1s10ns and with conservation measures adopted by the 
Commission and to which the Party is bound. To meet this obligation, Parties are 
required to set in place measures to ensure that all activities which fall within their 
jurisdiction are undertaken consistently with the purpose of the Convention. 
Logically, this obligation encompasses activities of nationals and companies as well 
as flag vessels within the jurisdiction of that Party.
105 
The apparent indifference of non-Party governments of Panama, Vanuatu, 
Seychelles and Belize and others to the unregulated fishing by their flag vessels in the 
CCAMLR area clearly sets them at odds with the aforementioned conservation and 
cooperation duties. However, it is equally apparent that those CCAMLR member 
States whose citizens use vessels registered in the above countries for TIJU fishing are 
also obliged to act to control those nationals to prevent them from undermining 
CCAMLR's conservation efforts.
106 The primacy of the obligation of the flag State 
does not abrogate the responsibility of other Parties. Similarly, full observance of the 
duty of cooperation on the part of member States whose nationals practice unchecked 
TIJU fishing would logically extend to taking action to prevent nationals undermining 
conservation measures. 
CCAMLR Parties are clearly obliged, as far as they are able, to address the TIJU 
fishing activities of their nationals - even on foreign flagged vessels. Against this 
background of duties of active conservation, it would be incongruous for them to 
choose not to exercise appropriate jurisdiction based on nationality if a legitimate 
means to do so existed. It is submitted that to fully meet these obligations, CCAMLR 
as an organisation, and its members individually, need to recognise their responsibility 
to do everything in their power to curb the illegal plunder of the Patagonian toothfish. 
105 See "Further Measures to Combat Illegal, Umeported and Umegulated Fishing in the Convention 
Area" paper presented by the New Zealand delegation to CCAMLR XVII (Hobart, October 1998) 
published in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Commission for the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources CCAMLR XVI!: Hobart 26 October - 6 November 
1998: Report of the New Zealand Delegation (Wellington, 1998) Annex E. 
106 The discussion above has used the term "nationals" used in Article 117 to encompass vessels, and 
legal and natural persons. This interpretation is not universally acknowledged, as was evident in 
CCAMLR's discussion of the 1998 proposal prior to the CCAMLR meeting in which the EC 
maintained that vessels only were covered by the term. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Internal 
Report "Antarctic Fisheries: CCAMLR: Enforcement and Compliance" C05506/BRU 10 September 
1998. 
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Their duty to do so in international law is clear. This discussion will now tum to the 
question of whether international law allows for the exercise of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction over nationals as a mechanism for giving that duty effect. 
28 
IV JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
New Zealand's 1998 suggestion that member States should exercise jurisdiction 
over nationals to assist CCAMLR to combat IUU fishing prompted a number of 
countries to suggest that such an initiative would somehow undermine the concept of 
flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas. 107 This position requires further 
examination. 
Prescriptive and Enforcement Jurisdiction 
The term "jurisdiction" describes the characteristic power of States to define and 
enforce the rights and duties of the natural and legal persons over which they exercise 
authority. 108 It thus consists of both prescriptive and enforcement elements. A State 
exercises the former by the creation of rules to control people's conduct, relations, 
status or interests in things. Such rules may be made by legislation, executive act or 
order, administrative rule or regulation, or judgment of a court. Enforcement 
jurisdiction is the physical and material action taken by the State to impose those 
rules. 109 The nature of a State's entitlement and obligation to exercise either type of 
jurisdiction as regards its nationals, and vessels, varies according to where the State 
seeks to give it effect. 110 
Extra-territorial Jurisdiction 
An often cited cardinal rule of international law holds that a State's 
sovereignty implies unlimited prescriptive legal authority to prescribe the laws to 
107 See discussion at 19-20 above. 
108 More narrowly, "jurisdiction" describes a State's authority to establish procedures for identifying 
breaches of its rules and the precise consequences thereof and to impose consequences for such 
breaches. The term is also used at times to refer to a State's right to act on behalf of the said persons 
vis-a-vis other international persons. See Bernhard H Oxman in R Bemhadt ( ed) Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law Vo! 3 (Elesvier, Amsterdam, 1991) 55. See also Brian D Smith State 
Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) at 143-4. 
109 Smith, above, 133. 
110 ReStatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 401 (Tent. Draft no 3, 
1982) 
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apply within its own territory. 111 Prescriptive jurisdiction may be exercised by a State 
in relation to all persons (and resources) within its territorial limits irrespective of 
their nationality. 112 International law also recognises that acts of prescriptive 
jurisdiction may extend abroad in certain circumstances. Legal commentators note 
that exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive legal authority is acceptable provided the 
State possesses a substantial and direct connection with the facts, so long as it does 
not interfere in the central internal affairs of another State and that "the elements of 
accommodation, mutuality, and proportionality'' are respected.
113 
Extra-territorial prescriptive jurisdiction has been accepted m five recognised 
situations: 114 
(i) where the conduct in question has territorial impact; 
(ii) to protect the interests of the State (typically security and public 
processes); 
(iii) where the conduct in question is a delicta juris gentiurn offence subject to 
universal jurisdiction (such as piracy); 
(iv) when involving a State's 'passive personality' (where the conduct abroad 
affects the person or interests of a national); and 
(v) when the conduct in question is perpetrated by the State's nationals abroad. 
The legitimacy of enforcement jurisdiction may be similarly differentiated 
between territorial and extra-territorial situations. Territorial enforcement of law bears 
little restraint. However, the authority to prescribe with respect to matters within the 
borders of a foreign State discussed above, does not carry with it the authority to 
enforce in such regions. The enforcement authority of the State within its own 
111 The relationship between jurisdiction and sovereignty is subject to debate. Compare FA Mann The 
Doctrine of Jurisdiction in international law (1964) 111 Recueil des Cours I and Rosalyn Higgens 
"The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction" in Professor Cecil J Olmstead (ed) Extraterritorial Application Of 
Laws And Responses Thereto (ECS Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 1984) 3, 4. 
112 See Sir Robert Jennings, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws" (1957) 
33 Brit Yb Int'l L 146, Wade Estey "The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of 
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality" (1997) Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 177, 177, Higgens, 
above, 5 and MN Shaw International law (Grotius Publications Ltd, Cambridge, 1991) 393-4. 
11 3 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public international law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1998) 309-310, 313. See also Jennings, above, 157-160 and Higgens, above, 6. 
114 See Harvard Research in International Law "Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime" ( 1935) 29 Am J 
lnt'l L 474 and Christopher L Blakesley "Criminal Law: United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial 
Crime" ( 1982) 73 J Crim & Criminology 1109, 1110. 
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territory is exclusive. Accordingly, no other State may take any measure to enforce its 
law in another's territory without its consent. 11 5 
Some of the ambiguity about the extent to which a State's jurisdiction may be 
exercised extraterritorially may be attributed to The Lotus. 11
6 In that case the 
Permanent Court of International Justice equated a State's jurisdiction over its flag 
vessels to its jurisdiction in its territory. 11 1 The PCIJ first emphasised the exclusivity 
of the flag State's (territorial) jurisdiction over the vessel on the high seas, but then 
went on to qualify that proposition so far as both legislative (prescriptive) and judicial 
(enforcement) jurisdiction was concerned. The court reiterated that a State was not 
able to exercise its power outside its frontiers in the absence of a permissive rule of 
international law. 11 8 However, the court continued, "it by no means follows that a 
State can never in its own territory exercise jurisdiction over acts which have occurred 
on board a foreign ship on the high seas." 11 9 
Commentators recognise that a well established and generally accepted rule of 
international law be identified in only a small number of cases. 
120 Accordingly, 
enforcement jurisdiction is restricted usually to the presence of the suspect in the 
territorial limits .121 However, within those limits, the exclusivity of another State's 
115 Brownlie, above, 303. See also Brian D Smith State Responsibility and the Marine Environment 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) at 132 -133 
11 6 SS Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Ser A, no 10 
11 7 Early expressions of the character and basis of the flag State's authority relied on an assimilation of 
vessels to the territory of the State, depicting a ship as a 'kind of floating island ' . See Q v Anderson 
(1868) LR I CCR 161 and Patterson v Th e Eudora 190 US 169 (1903). See also the majority opinion 
in the Lotus, above. The assimilation theory has now been superseded by acceptance of the rationale 
that flag State jurisdiction is the product of common sense, consensus and necessity. See Judge Finlay's 
dissent in the Lotus, above, 53. However, territoriality continues to be used as a metaphor for the 
characteristics of flag State jurisdiction. International law accepts that a State's legal authority over 
persons, property and conduct aboard vessels flying its flag is analogous to that exercised within its 
borders. See Smith, above, 151. 
11 8 In The Lotus MM Huber, President of the PCIJ, said "Far from laying down a general prohibition to 
the effect that States may not extend their application of their laws and the jurisdiction, [international 
law] leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules, as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it 
regards as best and most suitable .. .. In these circumstances all that is required of a State is that it should 
not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction." SS Lotus Case [1927] PCIJ 
Ser A, no 10,19. 
11 9 The Lotus, above, 25 . 
120 Prosper Weil "International Law Limitations on State Jurisdiction" in Cecil J Olmstead (ed) 
Extraterritorial Application Of Laws And Responses Thereto (ECS Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 1984) 33-7. 
121 MN Shaw International Law (Grotius Publications Ltd, Cambridge, 1991) 393-4. 
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jurisdiction in the territory where the offence took place is no impediment to a State 
exercising jurisdiction in respect of the same act in its own courts. 122 
Nationality Jurisdiction 
The nationality base of jurisdiction, which was the legal foundation for the 
unsuccessful CCAMLR 'nationals initiative', permits a State to exercise control over 
its nationals wherever they might be. 123 The ambit of the State's jurisdiction over its 
nationals extends to the high seas, and even foreign countries, subject only to the 
rights of other nations or their nationals. 124 The State's protection of its nationals 
abroad generates on their part a duty to obey its prescriptions. The State's right to 
control the conduct of its nationals enables it to give effect to its interests, such as 
deterring them from conduct which damages its reputation and foreign relations. 125 
The principle of nationality jurisdiction is underlain by the concept of certain 
duties to their homeland owed by citizens of State. These obligations persist 
regardless of the national's current residence as long as certain bonds of allegiance, 
such as citizenship, are maintained. 126 Over time, the principle has been extended by 
the ascription of nationality to corporations, vessels, and aircraft and by use of former 
(relinquished) nationality, residence and other connections as evidence of allegiance 
owed by aliens. 127 
Although international law allows States to exercise jurisdiction in respect of its 
nationals wherever they may be, it does not oblige them to do so. 128 Consequently, 
122 One potential obstacle lies in the presumption against double jeopardy discussed below at 54. 
123 Shalom Kassan attributes the origins of nationality based jurisdiction to ancient times "when 
territorial boundaries were often vague, and communities were defined by the religion, race or the 
nationality of the people" rather than by the territory. Kassan "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 
Ancient World" (1935) 29 Am J Int'l L 237, 240. Watson notes that in the modem era, more use has 
been made of nationality jurisdiction by civil law courts than by their common law counterparts. 
Geoffrey R Watson "Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction" (1992) 
17 Yale J oumal of International Law 41,46. 
124 Lauritzen v Larsen 345 US 571; 73 S Ct 921; 97 L Ed 1254; 1953 US LEXIS 2533. 
125 Watson, above, 68-69. 
126 Wade Estey "The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of the Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality" (1997) Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 177, 182. 
127 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1998) 306. See also Covey T Oliver and others The International Legal System (4th ed, Foundation 
Press, New York, 1995) 166. 
128 Sir Arthur Watts International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System (Cambridge, Grotius Press, 
1992) 166 
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there are substantial variations in the character of State practice based on nationality 
jurisdiction. Extraterritorial prescriptive elements are evident in New Zealand 
legislation in a range of criminal, citizenship, fisheries, transport, taxation and social 
security legislation. 129 Other States have also developed a variety of applications. 
Like New Zealand, the United States, Sweden, Germany and Australia have 
responded to child sex tourism through domestic laws enabling them to prosecute 
their own nationals for engaging in child sex crimes abroad. 130 The United Kingdom 
legislature has conferred jurisdiction over nationals in respect of treason, murder, 
bigamy, and breaches of the Official Secrets Act, 131 wherever those offences may be 
committed. 132 Typical United States assertions of jurisdiction under the nationality 
principle include the application of tax statutes and the prosecution of United States 
nationals for treason and relations with enemy nations and rules for requisitioning. 133 
France in 1795 established jurisdiction over all French nationals who commit 'serious 
crimes' outside its territories. 134 
Nationality provides the principle basis of jurisdiction for all States in cases of 
criminal acts in locations where the territorial criterion is inappropriate, such as in 
outer space, 135 or in Antarctica. 136 The 1991 Madrid Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 137 for example, relies on the nationality principle for 
129 See S J Shields Out of Sight - Out of Mind? Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (LLM Research Paper, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 1981) 78. 
130 See Eric Thomas Berkman "Responses to the International Child Sec Tourism Trade" (1996) Boston 
College Int'l & Comp LR 397 and Margaret A Healy "Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists At Home: Do 
Laws in Sweden, Australia, and the United States Safeguard the Rights of Children As Mandated by 
International Law?" (1995) 18 Fordham Int'l LJ 1852. 
131 Official Secrets Act 1911 (UK) 
132 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1998) 303. 
133 See Wade Estey "The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of the Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality" (1997) Hastings Int ' l & Comp L Rev 177, 182-186. 
134 See Code de 3 brumaire an 4, art 11 (Oct 23 1795) discussed in Geoffrey R Watson "Offenders 
Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction" (1992) 17 Yale Journal oflnternational 
Law" 41 , 46. 
135 For example, see the 1998 Agreement Among the Governments of Canada, Governments of Member 
States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian 
Federation, and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation in the Detailed 
Design, Development, Operation and Utilisation of the Permanently manned Civil Space Station ( 29 
January 1998) published as schedule to Civil International Space Station Implementation Act 1999 
(Canada). 
136 Ian Brownlie, above, 306. 
137 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959 ( 4 October 1991) 
1991 ILM 461 ; UKTS 1999 No 6 (cm 4256) ; NZTS 1998 No 3. 
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its effective implementation. In g1vmg domestic effect to the Madrid Protocol, 
countries, including CCAMLR Parties New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, prescribe strict conditions for the activities of their nationals 
and on companies within their jurisdiction.138 
Nationality based jurisdiction has also been developed as a tool of high seas 
fisheries management, as will be discussed further below. Its prescriptive use in these 
extra-territorial situations has been unquestioningly embraced by the international 
community. Based on the general principles discussed above, it can be seen that a 
State's nationals can not escape the confines of its laws by boarding a foreign vessel. 
Nor can reflagging their vessels to foreign registries set them outside its prescriptive 
reach. Accordingly, a State's authority can legitimately extend to directing nationals 
to conduct fishing operations on board foreign flagged vessels consistently with 
standards prescribed by that State. 139 It is only extra-territorial enforcement of those 
nationality based prescriptions which remains contentious. 
138 See Antarctica (Environmental Protection) Act 1994 s 1; Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) 
1980 (Cth) s4(1)(b); Antarctica Act 1994 (UK) ss 6-10 and 21-23 and Antarctic Conservation Act 44 
USC§ 2402 (1996). 
139 See Smith, above, 153. 
34 
V JURISDICTION ON THE HIGH SEAS 
The principal objection raised to the 1998 proposal to formalise nationality 
jurisdiction in CCAMLR was concern that so doing would undermine the traditional 
principle of flag State jurisdiction. The concerns expressed by those States so minded 
implied the exclusivity of jurisdiction on board another State's flagged vessel was in 
some way more inviolable than States' jurisdiction over their land based territory. 
Their objections made no distinction between extra-territorial prescription and 
enforcement, thus suggesting that both were at odds with the accepted norms of high 
seas governance. The analysis above has shown that this is not so. Non-flag States 
are clearly entitled to prescribe law to apply extraterritorially to their nationals. 
Accordingly, discussion here focuses on the concept of flag State enforcement 
jurisdiction, its clear limitations in the face of flags of convenience and contemporary 
alternatives to exclusive flag-State-based compliance regimes. 
Flag State Jurisdiction 
The concept of flag State jurisdiction essentially vests sovereignty over vessels 
on the high seas in the State of the flag which each vessel flies. The principle was 
developed through customary international law and treaties so as to subject the high 
seas to a legal order. 140 As Grotius established, there is no inherent sovereignty over 
the open ocean because it is outside the territorial dominion of any single State. It 
follows from the notion of freedom of the high seas that that all rights pertaining to 
ocean resources reside in all States equally. 141 The grant of its flag is the mechanism 
by which a State gives individuals the right to benefit from its share in those collective 
sovereign rights. 142 
140 The need for protection of vessels from the hazards of interState commercial relations and wartime 
neutrality prompted the evolution of the notion of connection of every vessel to a single, identified 
flag. See Boleslaw Adam Boczek Flags of Convenience: An International legal Study (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1967) 94. See also Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur 
Watts (eds) Oppenheim 's International law Voll (9th ed, Longman, Harlow Essex, 1992) 727. 
141 Myres S McDougal, William T Burke, and Ivan A Vlasic "The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea 
and the Nationality of Ships" (1960) 54 American Journal oflntemational Law 25, 61. 
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The principle of flag State jurisdiction is codified in the 1982 United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention. UNCLOS provides that ships may avail themselves of 
the flag of one State only and that vessels are subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of 
that flag State while on the high seas. 143 It also requires each State to exercise its 
jurisdiction to control "effectively" administrative, technical and social matters 
relating to all ships it permits to fly its flag.144 The act of granting its flag thus entitles 
the State to apply its internal law over each ship flying its flag including its master, 
officers and crew. In assuming legal authority over a vessel by admission to its 
register, the State also assumes an obligation to ensure that the vessel and those on 
board act consistently with international law. 145 
The primacy of the flag State's jurisdiction underlines the entitlement of the flag 
States of the Southern Ocean ruu fishing fleet to demand recognition of their 
jurisdiction over such vessels. Their right to prescribe and enforce laws applying to 
those vessels within and beyond their maritime territory must be respected. No State 
may directly apply its authority to the ships of those States, except as in specific 
instances authorised by international law. Likewise, the flag State may protect the 
ships to which it has ascribed its national character against unlawful interference and 
deprivation by other States. 146 On closer examination, however, these rules confirm 
that the exclusivity prescribed by the UNCLOS regime relates essentially to 
enforcement jurisdiction - application of law, and deprivations in accordance with it, 
not the passage of extraterritorial law itself. 
Flags of Convenience Jurisdiction 
The exclusive nature of flag State enforcement jurisdiction is a clearly 
articulated and long held tenet of international law. The concept has not been immune 
142 Brian D Smith State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 
157. 
143 Article 9-2 . 
144 Article 94. 
145 See Boczek, above, 284. 
146 Myres S McDougal, William T Burke, and Ivan A Vlasic "The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea 
and the Nationality of Ships" (1960) 54 Am J Int'l Law, 25, 26-27, Boleslaw Adam Boczek Flags of 
Convenience: An International l egal Study (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 
1967) 92. 
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to challenge, however, in situations where flag States have failed to exercise the 
jurisdiction so vested in them. CCAMLR's records of its battle with the illegal 
fishery are replete with incidents of such failure. Reliance on non-member flag States 
to enforce CCAMLR's conservation measures has achieved little to curb the piracy of 
Patagonian toothfish. Even those Commission members most vocal in their objection 
to the nationality initiative recognise the particular challenge facing the organisation 
in the form of flag of convenience vessels. 
147 
Flags of convenience offer vessel owners considerable financial benefits, 
including avoidance of stringent safety standards, high wages, training requirements, 
and vessel conditions. 148 Reflagging is also a relatively easy means for a fishing vessel 
to escape internationally agreed conservation and management measures on the high 
seas which its own flag State would have otherwise enforced.
149 In 1999 the F AO 
reported to the International Maritime Organisation that some five per cent of fishing 
vessels in the 100-150 gross registered tonne (GRT) range were flagged in open 
registers. That percentage rose to 14 per cent for fishing vessels over 4000 GRT.
150 
The report also noted that the number of fishing vessels being registered under open 
registers has continued to increase in spite of an overall reduction in the size of the 
global fishing fleet. 151 The F AO attributed much of the increase in fishing vessels in 
open registers to a proliferation of new countries offering flags of convenience. 
152 
International law permits States to fix for themselves the conditions for the grant 
of their nationality to vessels, for the registration of vessels in their territory, and for 
147 See, for example, the comments of Norway's 1998 CCAMLR Alternate Commissioner Terje Lobach 
in "Measures to be Adopted by the Port State in Combating IUU Fishing" Paper presented to the Expert 
Consultation on Illegal, Umeported and Umegulated Fishing organised by the Government of Australia 
in cooperation with the FAO (Sydney, 15-19 May 2000) AUS:IUU/2000/ 15. 
148 See George C. Kasoulides Port State Control and Jurisdiction: Evolution of the Port State Regime 
(M Nijhoff, Boston, 1993) 76; see also Oceans and the law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary 
General (United Nations, New York, 2000) Doc. A/54/429, paragraph 185. 
149 Penelope Ridings "Compliance, Enforcement and the Southern Oceans: The Need for a New 
Approach" in RA Herr (ed) Sovereignty at Sea: From Westphalia to Madrid (Wollongong Papers on 
Maritime Policy No 11, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 2000) 175, 183. 
15° FAO Report to the Seventy-First Session of the International Maritime Organisation's Maritime 
Safety Committee (London, 19-28 May 1999) 
151 In a 1997 report Greenpeace noted that fifteen percent of new additions to the world's fishing fleet 
belonged to Honduras, Liberia, and Cyprus. See discussion of Greenpeace findings in Kevin Bray "A 
Global Review of Illegal, Umeported and Umegulated (IUU) Fishing" Paper presented to the Expert 
Consultation on Illegal, Umeported and Umegulated Fishing organised by the Government of Australia 
in cooperation with the FAO (Sydney, 15-19 May 2000) AUS:IUU/2000/6. 
152 FAO, above. 
37 
the right to fly their flags. 153 A number of countries allow the registration of foreign 
owned and foreign controlled vessels under conditions which are convenient for the 
persons registering the vessels. 154 Such 'open registries' operate an 'open door' policy, 
enabling natural and legal persons, regardless of their nationality, to register their 
ships with them and sail under their flags. 155 Together with the complexities of 
multinational corporate structures, the phenomena of open registries can lead to 
situations where vessels may be built in one State, fly the flag of another State, and be 
owned and controlled by persons in yet other countries. Such vessels may also change 
their State of registration frequently. 157 
The authorities of so-called 'flags of convenience' registries are often hampered 
in their exercise of flag State jurisdiction by the fact their only link with the vessel 
concerned is the act of registration itself. Such flag States struggle to enforce fishing 
regulations over vessels which rarely call at their ports. They often lack the 
infrastructure necessary for policing a high seas fleet, or the real authority to exert 
control over powerful multinational fishing interests. 158 Significantly, however, flag 
States are often reluctant to strictly enforce international obligations for fear of 
discouraging often lucrative flag of convenience registration. 159 
153 Article 91 UNCLOS. 
154 Boczek, above, 2. 
155 Emeka Duruigbo "Multinational Corporations and Compliance with International Regulations 
Relating to the Petroleum Industry" (2001) 7 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 101 , 110. 
156 A 1979 UK Committee of Inquiry into Shipping identified the salient features of flags of 
convenience as vessel ownership by non-nationals, easy access to the registry, taxes that are low and 
levied abroad, participation mainly by small powers to whom receipts from the business might make a 
difference to national income and balance of payments, manning of the ships by non-nationals, and lack 
of the power and administrative machinery to impose regulations or the inclination or capability to 
control the companies. Committee of Inquiry into Shipping, Report 51 (London: HMSO, 1979) CMND 
4337. Open registries offer non-nationals reduced operating costs through avoidance of requirements 
to employ qualified personnel for manning and crewing purposes, social security obligations and the 
influence of strong. See Duruigbo, above, 113-114. 
157 Masuyaki Komatsu "The Importance of Taking Cooperative Action Against Specific Fishing 
Vessels that are Diminishing Effectiveness of Tuna Conservation and Management Measures" Paper 
presented to the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing organised by the 
Government of Australia in cooperation with the FAO (Sydney, 15-19 May 2000) AUS:IUU/2000/5. 
158 See Duruigbo, above, 108. . 
159 Income derived from vessel registration fees can be a significant source of revenue for flag States 
and foreign owned fishing vessels can make a significant contribution to a State's efforts to build catch 
history. On open registry operation generally see Paul Stephen Dempsey "Compliance and 
Enforcement in International Law: Oil Pollution of the Marine Environment by Ocean Vessels" (1984) 
6 J lnt'l L Bus, 459, 527. 
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The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has pointed out that: 160 
there is nothing in [UNCLOSJ to permit a State which discovers evidence indicating the 
absence of proper jurisdiction and control by a flag State over a ship to refuse to 
recognise the right of such a ship to fly the flag of that State. 
States' right to themselves decide under what conditions they will grant nationality to 
their ships implicitly obliges other States to recognise the unilateral exercise of this 
right. However, UNCLOS also provides that there must exist a genuine link between 
the State and the ship. 161 It might be thought that a relationship between a State and 
reflagged foreign controlled fishing vessel based on no more than the act of 
registration would fail to meet this standard. However, UNCLOS neither clearly 
defines a 'genuine link' 162 nor explicitly accepts that its absence can justify another 
State exerting control over that vessel on the high seas. 163 
In a number of cases, States in which foreign flagged vessels are owned and 
controlled have sought recognition of an entitlement to exert control over the vessel 
on that basis. In most of these the nationality of ownership of the vessel has proved 
largely insufficient to dislodge the primary competence of the State of its 
registration. 164 However, international law has responded to situations when the flag 
160 M/V "Saiga" (No 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) (1999) 38(5) ILM 1323, 1343 
(ITLOS). 
161 The concept of the 'genuine link' originates in the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) 
April 6 1955 (ICJ Rep 1955, 4) where the International Court of Justice faced the question of whether a 
State could exercise consular protection in respect of an individual whose connection with that State 
was limited in nature. While acknowledging that a State could fix the rules relating to nationality, the 
majority opinion delivered by President Green H Hackworth recognised that for the right of consular 
protection to be recognised the legal bond of nationality had to accord with the individual's genuine 
link with the State assuming to protect its citizen. The concept was introduced to formal international 
law in 1958 by the Convention on the High Seas having being extensively debated earlier in the 
International Law Commission and United Nations. See Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds) 
Oppenheim 's International law Voll (9th ed, Longman, Harlow Essex, 1992) 732. 
162 Subsequent attempts to defme the concept led to the 1986 negotiation of the United Nations 
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships. That Agreement never came into force, and efforts 
have since focused on flag State responsibility. See Budislav Vukas and Davor Vidas "Flags of 
Convenience and High Seas Fishing" in Olav Schram Stokke ed Governing High Seas Fisheries: The 
interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford, University Press, 2001) 53-90, 65-66. 
163 In the "Saiga" (No 2) Case, above, 1342-3, ITLOS noted that "while the obligation regarding a 
genuine link was maintained in the 1958 Convention, the proposal that the existence of a genuine link 
should be the basis for the recognition of nationality was not adopted." 
164 See the SS I'm Alone (Canada v United States of America) (1933), (1935) 39 AJIL 326, (1949) 3 
Rep Int Arb A wards 1611 in which Commissioners appointed to decide upon the Canadian claim for 
compensation for a vessel sunk by the US for smuggling liquor found the vessel de facto owned, 
controlled, and, at the critical times, managers and its movements directed and its cargo dealt with and 
disposed of by US citizens but still held the act of sinking the vessel "unlawful" and ordered the United 
States to apologise and pay to the Canadian Government $25,000. See also Anklagemyndigheden v 
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State is unable or unwilling to take responsibility, by recognising exceptions to flag 
State jurisdiction which allow for a certain degree enforcement over the vessel itself 
by non-flag States. 165 
The Narrowing Exclusivity of Flag State Jurisdiction 
UNCLOS, therefore, offers a clear presumption that enforcement of rules over 
the vessels and those aboard while on the high seas will generally rest with the flag 
State, but it also allows that is this is not always so. Other States' jurisdictional 
competence may be territorial in nature or it may be based on one of the other 
accepted bases of jurisdiction: universality, nationality, territorial impact, passive 
personality or protective 'act of State'. 166 
A number of exceptions to flag State enforcement jurisdiction within UN CLOS 
rely on the territorial sovereignty of port and coastal States. The Convention 
authorises the coastal State to take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent 
passage which is not innocent, or to prevent any breach of the conditions to which 
admission of those ships to its internal waters port facilities outside its internal waters 
is subject. 167 Further, in respect of its sovereign rights of conserving and managing 
natural resources, coastal States may take measures, including boarding, inspection, 
arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the 
laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with the UNCLOS regime. 168 
International law also recognises in port States authority to exercise enforcement 
jurisdiction over marine pollution violations that occur on the high seas or in the 
Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp 1992 ECJ I 6019 in which the European Court of 
Justice considered the applicability of an EU regulation which implemented conservation measures 
(prohibiting the transport and storage on board of salmon caught in certain areas not under the 
sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Member States) to the Danish crew of a Panama flagged but Danish 
owned and controlled vessel. The court held that a vessel registered in a non-member country could not 
be treated as a vessel with the nationality of a Member State on the ground that it had a genuine link 
with that Member State. The court also reiterated that the nationality of the master and crew were 
insufficient grounds to displace the flag State's jurisdiction over the vessel. 
165 David Vidas "Emerging Law on the Sea issues in the Antarctic Maritime Area: A Heritage for the 
New Century" (2000) 31 Ocean Dev and Int ' l Law 197, 203 . 
166 Myres S McDougal, William T Burke, and Ivan A Ylasic "The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea 
and the Nationality of Ships" (1960) 54 Am J Int'l L 25 , 84. 
167 Article 25. 
168 Article 73. 
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waters of other nations which might have senous repercuss10ns within their 
territory. 169 
UNCLOS also provides extra-territorial exceptions to exclusive flag State 
enforcement jurisdiction. All States have the right of visit and search in enforcement 
of universal prohibitions against piracy, the slave trade, and unauthorised 
broadcasting. 170 Through recognition of the right of hot pursuit, UNCLOS authorises 
coastal States to continue onto the high seas in the uninterrupted pursuit of foreign 
vessels in relation to offences committed within their territory.
171 
Further exceptions to flag State jurisdiction can also be found in the fisheries 
context. The Fish Stocks Agreement allows States which are members of regional 
fisheries organisations to board and inspect fishing vessels flying the flag of another 
State which is a party to the Agreement irrespective of whether the violator (which 
must be a Party to the Fish Stocks Agreement) is a Party to the particular treaty 
establishing the rule. 172 Similar exceptions are evident in a number of regional 
fisheries management organisations. Boarding and inspection authority is extended to 
other member States by many such arrangements.
173 Others go further providing for 
non flag State arrest and detention. 174 
169 See Articles 4-6 of MARPOL 73/78 (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships 1973 as modified by the Protocol of the 1978 Relating Thereto (MARPOL 73/78) 1046 UNTS 
120), Part XII ofUNCLOS and the International Convention on Intervention on the High Seas in Cases 
of Oil Pollution Casualties (29 November 1969) 970 UNTS 211 and the 1973 Protocol relating to 
Intervention on the High Seas in Case of Marine Pollution by Substances Other Than Oil (2 November 
1973) 1313 UNTS 3; UKTS 27 (1983) ATS 1984 No 5. 
170 Article 110 recognises a right of visit of warships on the high seas where there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that a ship is engaged in piracy, the slave trade or unauthorised broadcasting, 
where the ship is without nationality, or where the vessels is flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its 
flag, when it is in reality the same nationality as the warship. Further, where the vessel sails under the 
flags of two or more States, using them according to convenience, it may be assimilated to a ship 
without nationality (Article 92(2)) and consequently subject to the right of visit under Article 110. 
171 Article 111. 
172 Article 21 ( 5)-(7). The flag State can either proceed with its own investigation and enforcement or 
can authorise the inspecting State to conduct the appropriate investigation and to take any necessary 
enforcement action. If the flag State, after notification, has failed to respond or take action and if the 
alleged violations are classified as serious, inspectors may remain on board and secure evidence and 
where appropriate may bring the vessel to the nearest port. 
173 See for example the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollack Resources in the 
Central Bering Sea (16 June 1994) <www.oceanlaw.net/texts/bering.htrn> (last accessed 3 February 
2002) (Article 11(6)-(7)); the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific 
Ocean (9 May 1952) <http: //sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/fisheries.north.pacific.1952.htrnl> (last 
accessed 3 February 2002) Art X(c); Framework Agreement for the Conservation of Living Marine 
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Concurrent Jurisdiction 
The discussion above has shown that persons aboard vessels on the high seas 
are not necessarily subject to the enforcement authority of vessel's flag State alone. 
Other States' interests also have legal effect. These can be prescribed 
extraterritorially and enforced too, provided a facilitating arrangement to which the 
flag State has consented to be bound is in place. These exceptions to the principle of 
exclusive flag State jurisdiction do not diminish the primary authority of the flag State 
with respect to its vessels on the high seas. Instead, they identify a degree of 
concurrent jurisdiction vested in other, non-flag, States. The protestation of 
inconsistency with international law propounded by those CCAMLR parties not 
enthused by the nationals initiative therefore lacks the full support of legal practice, 
treaty and convention on which it was based. 
The exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction over nationals in accordance with 
accepted principles of non-interference, accommodation and proportionality cannot 
undermine the flag State's sovereignty over the vessel. 175 Accordingly, the principle 
of flag State jurisdiction does not prevent CCAMLR Parties from prescribing 
legislation to require their nationals to conform with the regime's conservation 
measures. The principle does prevent them, however, from enforcing those laws 
while the vessel is on the high seas. The exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction is such 
that in the absence of the concurrence of the authorities of the State in which the IUU 
Resources on the High Seas of the South Pacific (Galapagos Agreement) (14 August 1999) 
<http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/galapogos.htm> (last accessed 3 February 2002) Article 9. 
174 ASOC gives as examples the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North 
Pacific Ocean (9 May 1952) <http://sedac .ciesin.org/entri/texts/fisheries .north.pacific.1952.html> (last 
accessed 3 February 2002) (Article lO(l)(a)-(b)); the Convention on the Conservation of Andromous 
Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean (11 February 1992) <http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/npas.htm> (last 
accessed 3 February 2002) Article 5; and the Agreement among Pacific Island States Concerning the 
Implementation and Administration of the Treaty of Fisheries between the Governments of Certain 
Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America (2 April 1987) NZTS 1988 
No 32; ATS 1988 No 42 which enables Pacific Island parties to not only arrest US vessels and crews, 
but also to in1pose penalties (Art 4(1)-(2)) . See "Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition Paper on the 
Creation of a CCAMLR Enforcement Regime" CCAMLR XVI/BG/38 (Paper presented to CCAMLR 
XVI, Hobart 27 October 1997) 8-10. 
175 See "Report of a Parliamentary Committee Inquiring into the Legal Regimes of the Australian 
Antarctic Territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands 14-16 October 1992" in W Bush ( ed) 
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fishing vessels are registered, extra-territorial enforcement of rules for a State's 
nationals will depend on the presence of the national within the territory of the 
aggrieved State. 176 Yet, as will be discussed below, this apparent limitation on the 
practical application of jurisdiction based on nationality has not inhibited signatories 
to a number of other fisheries arrangements from putting the concept to use. 
Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of lnterState and National Documents (loose-leaf, 
Oceania Publications Inc, New York) D.AU16101992. l paragraph 3.12. 
176 See Brian D Smith State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1988), 153. 
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VI NATIONALITY JURISDICTION IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
The analysis above has identified a right possessed by each State to prescribe its 
nationals conduct anywhere, including in the territory of another State and upon 
foreign flagged vessels. A State's duty to act positively to control its nationals may be 
authoritatively located in Article 117 of UNCLOS. That Article, to recall, imposes on 
all States a duty or individually, or cooperatively, to take such measures for their 
respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources 
of the high seas. 
The Meaning of 'Nationals' in Multilateral Arrangements 
The legal relationship between a flag State and vessel has historically been 
described as the 'nationality' of that vessel. 177 Hence, there is degree of ambiguity in 
the meaning of the term "nationals" used in Article 117 .178 The obligation set out in 
UN CLOS replicates a provision of the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas. 179 That Convention itself drew on the 
earlier work of the International Law Commission. 180 Although much of International 
Law Commission discussion addressed States' rights and obligations as regards 
"fishers", the 1958 Convention ultimately provided that: 181 
[F}or purposes of various articles in the Convention dealing with the effects upon fishing 
vessels of an actual or proclaimed conservation program, the term 'nationals' means 
fishing boats or craft of any size having the nationality of the State concerned, according 
to the law of that State, irrespective of the nationality of the members of their crews. 
This definition is somewhat incongruous given that term 'vessel' itself 1s 
synonymous with the individuals associated with a ship. Vessels do not themselves 
engage in conduct in violation of international rules, but are merely the tool by which 
177 Budislav Vukas and Davor Vidas "Flags of Convenience and High Seas Fishing" in Olav Schram 
Stokke ed Governing High Seas Fisheries: The interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford, 
University Press, 2001) 53, 54. 
178 At CCAMLR XVII the European Community, together with other Members, expressed the view that 
the term 'nationals' in the context of Article 117 refers to vessels only. Report of the Seventeenth 
Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1998) paragraph 5.64. 
179 Convention on the High Seas (29 April 1958) 463 UNTS 366. 
180 See United Nations Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1955 Volume I: Summary 
records of the seventh session (United Nations, New York, 1960) 
44 
human actors do so. 182 With growing public awareness of current global fisheries 
crisis, the commonly accepted meaning of the obligation as regards "nationals" can 
seen to have broadened, eclipsing any doubt that it extends to citizens and registered 
compames. 
The 1982 negotiators of UNCLOS did not retain the explicit Statement that 
"nationals" meant fishing vessels. More recent multilateral agreements have clearly 
spelled out distinct obligations as regards nationals as well as flag vessels. The Code 
of Conduct, for example, provides that States should identify and secure the 
collaboration of relevant domestic parties in achieving responsible fisheries 
management. 183 Further references to nationals within the Code include an injunction 
to ensure that measures applicable in respect of masters and other officers charged 
with an offence relating to the operation of fishing vessels include "provisions which 
may permit, inter alia, refusal, withdrawal or suspension of authorisation to serve as 
masters or officers of a fishing vessel." 184 
The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA) identifies the UNCLOS provisions as the 
source of obligations on States to identify those nationals who are the operators or 
beneficial owners of vessels involved in IUU fishing; 185 to discourage nationals from 
flagging fishing vessels under the jurisdiction of a State that does not meet its flag 
State responsibilities; 186 and to ensure that sanctions for IUU fishing by vessels and 
nationals are of sufficient severity to effectively prevent, deter and eliminate IUU 
fishing and to deprive offenders of the benefits accruing from such fishing. 187 
A brief survey of other international fisheries instruments further illustrates the 
acceptance of jurisdiction over nationals as a tool of high seas fisheries management. 
181 Article 14 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (29 
April 1958) 559 UNTS 285. 
182 Brian D Smith State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988), 
147. 
183 Article 7.1.2 
184 Article 8.1.9 
185 Article 18. 
186 Article 19. 
187 Article 21. 
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The Fish Stocks Agreement provides for co-operation between relevant coastal States 
and "States whose nationals fish for straddling or highly migratory fish stocks in the 
adjacent high seas areas." 188 The Agreement requires States to ensure the full 
cooperation of their relevant national agencies and industries in implementing the 
recommendations and decisions of FMOs. 
Arrangements establishing a number of FMOs also refer separately to both 
'vessels' and 'nationals' suggesting that the latter encompasses natural and legal 
persons as well as ships. 189 Other recent FMO instruments make explicit references to 
members' obligations concernmg their nationals distinct from flag State 
responsibilities. 190 These responsibilities relating to the activities of nationals imply 
acceptance by their signatories that States may exert jurisdiction over the activities of 
those nationals undertaken on the high seas. 19 1 
Controls on Nationals in State Practice 
Consistent with this understanding of their international obligations, a number 
of the CCAMLR fishing parties, have already established extra-territorial controls 
over the high seas fishing activities of their citizens, residents and corporate entities. 192 
The New Zealand Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act 1981 provides that 
it is an offence for any person to take an Antarctic marine living organism from the 
188 Article 7 (a) and (b) . 
189 For example, the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (10 May 1993) UNTS 
1819 359; NZTS 1994 No 11 (Article 5(4)); and the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for 
Regional Fisheries (30 September 1994) <http://www.ocean1aw.net/texts/micronesia.htm> (last 
accessed 3 February 2002) (Arts 12 (2)) . 
190 See for example, the Convention on The Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (Article 23(5)), the Framework Agreement for the 
Conservation of Living Marine Resources on the High Seas of the South Pacific (Galapagos 
Agreement) (Article 8); the Agreement Between the Government of Iceland, the Government of 
Norway and the Government of the Russia Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of Cooperation in 
the area of Fisheries ( 15 May 1999) <http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/barents .htm> (last accessed 3 
February 2002) (Article 6); and the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery 
Resources In the South-East Atlantic Ocean (signed 20 April 2001 but not yet in force) 
<http://www.ocean1aw.net/texts/seafo.htm> (last accessed 3 February 2002), (Article 13 (6)(a)) . 
19 1 Penelope Ridings "Compliance, Enforcement and the Southern Oceans: The Need for a New 
Approach" in RA Herr (ed) Sovereignty at Sea: From Westphalia to Madrid (Wollongong Papers on 
Maritime Policy No 11 , Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 2000) 175-190, 186. 
192 Parties which notified CCAMLR of an intention to authorise flag vessels to fish in the CCAMLR 
Area in the 2001/02 season comprised: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Japan, ROK, New Zealand, 
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CCAMLR Convention Area, where that person is not authorised to do so either by 
New Zealand or by another CCAMLR Contracting Party. The Act applies to any act 
or omission occurring on any New Zealand ship or by any New Zealand citizen 
wherever that ship or person may be. 193 Section 113E of the New Zealand Fisheries 
Act 1996 prohibits New Zealand nationals from using a foreign vessel on the high 
seas to take for sale, to transport any fish, taken on the high seas, except in accordance 
with a high seas permit. 194 
The Spanish Fisheries Law 2001 195 leaves open the possibility of nationals 
fishing on reflagged vessels, but retains Spain's competence to find them guilty of 
administrative offences in relation to IUU fishing on such vessels. The legislation sets 
in place a regime of offences and sanctions applicable to all Spanish: 196 . 
ship owners, ship builders, shippers, captains, and managers, persons who direct fishing 
activities, transport carriers, any persons involved in the transport of fisheries products, 
owners of companies trading in or processing fisheries products and the responsible staff 
of such. 
Fishing without a permit, non-compliance with conditions therein, and any activity 
that threatens the management and conservation of living marine resources are 
'serious offences' under the law. Serious offences are elevated to 'very serious 
offences' if conducted by a Spanish national on a flag of convenience vessel. 197 
Norway, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay. See notification papers in Report of 
the Twentieth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 2001) Annex 2. 
193 Section 1 Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act 1981. 
194 Section l 13E of the Fisheries Act 1996 recognises authorisation given only by the competent agency 
of a State that is a party to the Fish Stocks Agreement; or a party to the F AO Compliance agreement; a 
party to, or has accepted the obligations of, a global, regional, or sub-regional fisheries organisation or 
arrangement to which the authorisation relates; or either a signatory to the Fish Stocks Agreement; or a 
State with legislative and administrative mechanisms to control its vessels on the high seas m 
accordance with that Agreement. Fishing other than in accordance with such a permit is an offence. 
195 Ley de Pesca Maritima de! Estado 26 March 2001 (B.O.E. No 75 De 28 de Marzo de 2001) 
196 Articles 90 - 91. 
197 Article 96 (1) (v). The limitations of Spain's legislation were revealed however in the prosecution of 
the master of the South Tomi. Spain's legislation requires the establishment of a list of flags of 
convenience by regulation. At CCAMLR XX Spain urged CCAMLR to produce such a list noting that 
it had been unable to prosecute the master of the South Tomi because no such list existed. See Report 
of the Twentieth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 2001) Annex V paragraph 2.21. 
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Australia's Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conservation Act 1981 also 
extends its jurisdiction to Southern Ocean fishing activity by Australian nationals as 
well as Australian vessels. 198 
Although not an explicit element of its CCAMLR related legislation, Japan 
recognises its extra-territorial jurisdiction over its nationals in regulations designed to 
reqmre Japanese nationals to obtain the Government's permission before working 
aboard non-Japanese flag fishing vessels operating in the Atlantic bluefin and 
Southern bluefin tuna fishing areas.199 It is also the Stated intention of the Japanese 
Government to deny its nationals permission to work aboard a foreign fishing vessel 
in any other fishery if the vessel's flag State is not a member of the fisheries 
organisation regulating that fishery. 200 
'Non-fishing' CCAMLR parties have also put extraterritorial prescriptions in 
place relating to nationals in the CCAMLR area. The United States Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources Convention Act 1984 forbids any "individual, partnership, 
corporation, trust, association and any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States" to engage in harvesting or associated activities in violation of 
provisions of the Convention or in violation of a conservation measure in force with 
respect to the US. 20 1 The Act deems it an offence to ship, transport, offer for sale, 
sell, purchase, import, export, or have custody, control or possession of, any Antarctic 
marine living resource ( or part or product thereof) known, or reasonably ought to have 
been known, to have been harvested in violation of a conservation measure. The 
offence provisions apply without regard to the vessel that was used. 202 
Similarly, the United States High Seas Fishing Compliance Act 1995 makes it 
unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to use a high 
198 Section 5(2)(a). Although Australia has ratified the Fish Stocks Agreement, it has yet to set in place 
an implementing regime to control the access of its fishing vessels and nationals to the high seas. See 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority Implementation of the United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement (Discussion Paper, 2001) . 
199 Ministry Decree Concerning Permission for Some Designated Fisheries (Article 98(2) Restriction on 
harvesting of tuna or marlin) 1998 
200 Masuyaki Komatsu "The Importance of Taking Cooperative Action Against Specific Fishing 
Vessels that are Diminishing Effectiveness of Tuna Conservation and Management Measures" Paper 
presented to the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing organised by the 
Governrnent of Australia in cooperation with the FAO (Sydney, 15-19 May 2000) AUS:IUU/2000/5. 
20 1 Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention Act 44A USC § 2432 (1984) 
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seas fishing vessel on the high seas in contravention of international conservation and 
management measures. 203 The Act uses an expansive definition of "vessel of the 
United States" to extend its jurisdiction to include vessels at least partly owned by US 
nationals or companies and vessels formerly owned by US unlawfully sold to non-
nationals or placed under a foreign flag. 204 
Examination of the relevant legislation of a number of other CCAMLR fishing 
States, however, shows continued reliance on flag State controls. While, Norway has 
regulations which allow it to control the activities of Norwegians, their application is 
specifically restricted to the presence of those nationals on its flag vessels.205 
Norway' s legislative response to IUU fishing has focused on territorial sanctions 
against non-nationals. Its Regulation Relating To Fishing And Hunting Operations By 
Foreign Nationals In The Exclusive Economic Zone of Norway provide that an 
application for a licence to fish in Norwegian waters may be denied if the vessel or its 
owner has taken part in an unregulated fishery on the high seas on a fish stock subject 
to regulations in waters under Norwegian fisheries jurisdiction. 206 
South Africa's fisheries legislation applies extraterritorially to any South 
African citizen or resident,207 and holds open the possibility of regulations to ensure 
the orderly development of high seas fisheries by South African persons and vessels, 
but its provisions for implementation of international conservation measures rely 
primarily on flag State action.208 Others, such as the Republic of Korea, do not address 
high seas fishing in their principal fisheries legislation at all. 209 
As shown, there are a number of examples of CCAMLR States already using 
nationality jurisdiction. However, the legislative practice of most Parties does not 
202 Section 2432-5 . 
203 Sections 5505-7 . 
204 Section 5502 (9)(B)(iii)(iv)- (C). The Act provides that no vessel shall engage in harvesting 
operations on the high seas without a valid permit s5503(a), no permit can be granted to a vessel which 
has been suspended because it undermined international conservation and management measures. No 
permit will be issued if the US will be unable to exercise its obligations toward that vessel. 
205 Regulation of 4 March 1998 Relating to Fisheries in Waters Outside the Fisheries Jurisdiction of any 
State (Norway). 
206 Regulation of 13 May 1977 Relating To Fishing And Hunting Operations By Foreign Nationals In 
The Exclusive Economic Zone of Norway. 
207 Section 70(1)(b) Marine Living Resources Act 1998 (RSA) 
208 Section 42 (3)(a)-(b) State that the Director-General may provide information on foreign vessels to 
flag State and notify them of a vessel 's presence in South African ports . 
II 
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demonstrate acceptance that States are required to take measures to control the fishing 
activities on the high seas of their citizens and companies as well as flag vessels. The 
legislation in place is patchy. To secure the cooperation necessary for its enforcement, 
the exercise of such jurisdiction needs to have a high degree of legitimacy, such as 
would come from the Commission formally recognising its utility and urging its 
implementation by all member States. 
209 See Fisheries Act (ROK) as amended by Act No 4253 August l 1990. 
50 
VII NATIONALITY JURISDICTION IN CCAMLR IN PRACTICE 
The discussion above has demonstrated that international law provides both a 
duty and a mechanism for CCAMLR parties to extend appropriate control over their 
nationals fishing in the CCAMLR area on flag of convenience vessels. It has also 
shown that some, but not all, CCAMLR members already have legislation in place to 
this effect. Use of the nationals mechanism would require specific action by both the 
Commission as a whole, and by all of its members individually. 
To mitigate any residual doubt that the conservation obligations assumed by 
States on their ratification of the UNCLOS and CCAMLR Conventions encompass 
the duty to exercise jurisdiction over nationals, that duty should be explicitly 
incorporated into the CCAMLR regime. 210 This could take the form of a dedicated 
conservation measure, or inclusion in a broader compliance protocol. 211 
In giving effect to such a measure, CCAMLR parties would need to ensure the 
consistency of their domestic legislation with that injunction.212 To this end, and 
ironically, the domestic legislation of United States, the sole CCAMLR Party not also 
Party to UNCLOS, provides a useful model. Contracting Parties would be well served 
by emulating its expansive extraterritorial coverage of subjects (individuals, 
partnerships, corporations, trusts, associations and any other entity subject to its 
jurisdiction) and activities (harvesting or associated activities in violation of 
provisions of the Convention or in violation of a conservation measure, shipping, 
transporting, offering for sale, selling, purchasing, importing, exporting, or having 
custody or control of IUU catch). 
210 With the exception of the United States all CCAMLR Members are Parties to UNCLOS. 
211 Penelope Ridings "Compliance, Enforcement and the Southern Oceans: The Need for a New 
Approach" in RA Herr (ed) Sovereignty at Sea: From Westphalia to Madrid (Wollongong Papers on 
Maritime Policy No 11, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 2000) 175-190, 187. 
212 Customary international law requires that signatory States must adopt and implement treaty rules 
into their national law. Once a State accepts international treaty obligations, it must usually develop, 
adopt, or modify existing national legislation to give effect to national policies or strategies that put 
treaty regulations into effect. Therefore, once the obligations concerning conservation and management 
of high seas, including Antarctic marine living resources fisheries are domestically implemented, 
governments must ensure that they are obeyed, specifically that those persons under that State's 
jurisdiction and control comply with that obligation. See Christopher C Joyner "Compliance and 
Enforcement in New International Fisheries Law" (1998) 12 Temp Int'l & Comp L J 271,279. 
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Parties' legislation should specify sufficiently serious penalties for the detailed 
infractions to serve as a deterrent. In addition to the punitive measures against the 
vessel, masters and crew set out in the Code of Conduct, which include provisions for 
revocation of master and crew authorisations, States should implement CCAMLR 
Resolution 13/XIX forbidding the relicencing or reflagging of such vessels. To further 
target the companies controlling the illegal fishery, Parties should introduce proceeds 
of crime measures whereby States can confiscate the assets of people convicted of 
offences related to IUU fishing insofar as those assets were derived from that criminal 
activity. 
Enforcement of violations with respect to nationals present in the territory of the 
State of nationality presents little theoretical difficulty. Individual and corporate 
vessel owners, and IUU catch traders are thus legitimate targets. Masters and crew 
members dependent on their State nationality for certification, and resident for 
revenue purposes are similarly accessible. With regard to front companies, non-
resident and nationals, the acquiescence of other States will be a necessary ingredient 
in successful application of the laws discussed above. 
A nationals enforcement regime would not displace responsibility for ensuring 
compliance by the vessel from the flag State. A nationals regime would instead 
provide an addition sanction if information becomes known to a Contracting party 
concerning the activities of a national who is fishing contrary to CCAMLR rules. 
That sanction would become available once the person concerned came within the 
territorial jurisdiction of his/her national State. 213 
In some situations prosecution by both the flag State and State of nationality 
would be possible. 214 Objections based on States' general intolerance of holding 
2 13 See "Further Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Convention 
Area" Paper presented by the New Zealand delegation to CCAMLR XVII published in Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade Commission for the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
living Resources CCAMLR XVl/: Hobart 26 October - 6 November 1998: Report of the New Zealand 
Delegation (Wellington, 1998) Annex E. 
214 See M Bryan Schneider and Jody Sturtz Shaffer "Annual Survey of Michigan Law: June 1 1998 -
May 31 1999: Constitutional Law" (2000) 46 Wayne L Rev 503 on the relationship between the 
principles of double jeopardy and separate sovereigns. 
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offenders double jeopardy2 15 can be countered by recognition of the acts of illegal 
fishing as offences against both the flag State and the State of nationality. While the 
double jeopardy obstacle would prevent the State of nationality passing judgment on 
the verdict of a flag State court or the adequacy of a penalty that court imposed,2 16 it 
would not disqualify it from trying an accused for a separate offence against its own 
legislation. 
In practice, a degree of cooperation on the part of flag, and even Port States, is 
likely to be needed for successful enforcement of jurisdiction over nationals. Eventual 
prosecution will generally require direct reliable evidence as would be best acquired 
on board the vessel, or from the landing documents of ports. Given that enforcement 
measures on board a foreign flag vessel will be generally confined to the presence of 
the vessel in the non-flag State's region of territorial authority, such information will 
be most easily collected by those other States. 
In the CCAMLR context, the residual primacy of flag State jurisdiction would 
arguably extend to 'first option' on prosecution and enforcement of sanctions on 
perpetrators of illegal conduct. Where the flag State has foregone that opportunity, 
there is no harm done to its sovereignty if the State of nationality chooses to prosecute 
in its own right. CCAMLR rules could require the State of nationality to cease its 
prosecution if proceedings have been commenced by the flag State. The goal of such 
a proposal, after all, is to deter IUU fishing. It matters little whether the nationality 
jurisdiction is applied on its own or used to prompt flag State compliance. 
215 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1998) 309. 
2 16 See for example P v P [1993] DCR 843 , Judge PA Moran, 849. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to examine the utility and legitimacy of CCAMLR's requiring 
its Contracting Parties to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over their nationals to 
stem the tide of illegal fishing by such nationals on vessels flagged to non-contracting 
States. Discussion of CCAMLR has demonstrated the magnitude of the illegal 
fishery. Action is urgently needed to tackle the main protagonists if further irreparable 
damage to fish stocks and the aquatic environment is to be avoided. The involvement 
of member State nationals across the spectrum of illegal activities represents a 
significant obstacle to the regime's continued functionality. 
In light of the entrenched practice of reflagging, CCAMLR's reliance on flag 
State responsibility is ineffective. Port and coastal State jurisdiction are also relatively 
impotent tools in the remote CCAMLR area. Nationality as a basis of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction holds part of the answer. 
Extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction is an almost unqualified right of all 
States; a product of their sovereignty. Extraterritorial enforcement has been revealed 
as a product of inter-State agreement, and, in fisheries management at least, such 
cooperation is a clearly emerging trend. Territorial enforcement of extraterritorial 
prescriptions is a matter of balance and accommodation. In the CCAMLR context, 
that balance is swung by the severity of the over fishing and the practical difficulties 
of alternative control mechanisms. Combating 'illegal' fishing for toothfish to 
conserve fish stocks and save albatrosses is a matter of sufficient seriousness to 
warrant the use of extraterritorial application of domestic legislation as another tool to 
help governments restrain and punish their citizens for offences committed in other 
jurisdictions. 
The notion of a responsibility to pursue all opportunities to protect the viability 
of high seas fisheries is borne out by examination of a number of multilateral fisheries 
agreements. UNCLOS, the Compliance Agreement, the Code of Conduct, the Fish 
Stocks Agreement and the IPOA all reveal the expectation of the international 
community that States will cooperate with organisations such as CCAMLR in the 
conservation of common marine resources. Environmental protection instruments 
lAW l' 
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describe those duties as active, and positive. It is no longer a valid choice for 
CCAMLR member States to rely on others to control the activities of their nationals. 
If an enforcement avenue is open to them, they must take it. 
The CCAMLR framework implicitly creates an obligation to this end. Using 
nationality jurisdiction to give effect to this duty, CCAMLR members will be able to 
set in place a real deterrent to IUU activities by their citizens, residents and 
companies, and to eliminate the impunity with which the illegal industry has 
conducted itself while outside their territorial reach. 
As the content of high seas conservation duties develop, failure to exercise 
jurisdiction against nationals may well come to be construed by coastal States as 
willful encouragement of poachers. But, realistically, nationality jurisdiction is only 
part of the answer to the flag of convenience problem. States must also take action to 
prevent the reflagging of vessels on their domestic registers. No single measure will 
be successful in eliminating IUU fishing, but all possible avenues of deterrence must 
be explored. 
Continued failure may well spell the end of CCAMLR. The involvement of 
nationals and companies of CCAMLR Contracting Parties in illegal and unregulated 
fishing for toothfish is the most significant problem eroding its effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Confining responsibility for unregulated fishing to non-Contracting Party 
flag States ignores the obligations of Parties to the CCAMLR Convention and hides 
behind the concept of the flag State jurisdiction. The victims of this approach are the 
CCAMLR regime and Antarctic resources. The New Zealand initiative remains on 
the CCAMLR table. Its members should revisit it. 
55 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Table of Cases 
SS Lotus (France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ ser A no 10 7 September 1927 
Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp 1992 ECJ I 
6019 
I'm Alone (1933), (1935) 39 AJIL 326, (1949) 3 Rep Int Arb Awards 1611 
Lauritzen v Larsen 345 US 571; 73 S Ct 921; 97 L Ed 1254; 1953 US LEXIS 2533 
M/ V "Saiga" (No 2) Case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea (1999) 38 (5) 
ILM 1323 (ITLOS) 
New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan (27 August 1999) 1999 ILM 38(6) 1624 
(ITLOS) 
Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) 1955 ICJ Rep 4 
P v P [1993] DCR 843. 
Patterson v The Eudora 190 US 169 (1903) 
Q v Anderson (1868) LR I CCR 161 
Table of Statutes 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act (1981) 
Ships Registration Act 1992 
Antarctica (Environmental Protection) Act 1994 
Fisheries Act 1996 
Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) 1980 (Cth) 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conservation Act 1981 (Cth) 
56 
ReStatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 401 (Tent 
Draft no 3, 1982) 
Antarctic Conservation Act 44 USC§ 2402-2404 (1996) 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention Act 44A USC § 2431-2444 (1984) 
Code de 3 brumaire an 4 (Oct 23 1795) reprinted in Robert W Rafuse The Extradition 
of Nationals (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1939) 135 . 
Regulation of 13 May 1977 Relating To Fishing And Hunting Operations By Foreign 
Nationals In The Exclusive Economic Zone of Norway location (Norway) 
Regulation of 4 March 1998 Relating to Fisheries in Waters Outside the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction of any State (Norway) 
Ley de Pesca Maritima del Estado 26 March 2001 (B.O.E. No 75 De 28 de Marzo de 
2001) (Spain) 
South African Marine Living Resources Act 1998 (RSA) 
Official Secrets Act 1911 (UK) 
Antarctica Act 1994 (UK) 
Ministry Decree Concerning Permission for Some Designated Fisheries 1998 (Japan) 
Fisheries Act 1990 (ROK) 
Civil International Space Station Implementation Act 1999 (Canada) 
Table of Treaties 
International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (9 
May 1952) <http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/fisheries.north.pacific . l 952.html> (last 
accessed 3 February 2002) 
Convention on the High Seas (29 April 1958) 450 UNTS 822; UKTS 1963 No 8; 
ATS 1963 No 12. 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 
Geneva (29 April 1958) 559 UNTS 285; UKTS 1966 No 39; ATS 1963 No 12. 
Antarctic Treaty (1 December 1959) 402 UNTS 71; NZTS 1961 No 12; ATS 1961 No 
12 UKTS 1961 No 97; CTS 1988 No 34. 
D 
• 
I 
57 
International Convention on Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties (29 November 1969) 970 UNTS 211; NZTS 1975 No 17; ATS 1984 No 4; 
UKTS 1975 No 77. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331; NZTS 
1971 No 4; ATS 1974 No 2; UKTS 1980 No 58; 8 ILM 679; CTS 1980 No 37. 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (2 November 
1973) as modified by the Protocol of 17 February 1978 Relating Thereto (MARPOL 
73/78) 1046 UNTS 120; NZTS 1975 No 20; ATS 1985 No 16; UKTS 1976 No 47. 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 20 May 1980 
1329 UNTS 47; NZTS 1981, No 12; ATS 1982 No 9; UKTS 1982 No 48; CTS 1988 
No 37; Basic Documents (7th ed, CCAMLR, Hobart, 1995) 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (10 December 1982) 21 ILM 1261 
1982; NZTS 1996 No 14. 
Protocol relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Case of Marine Pollution by 
Substances Other Than Oil (2 November 1983) ATS 1984 No 5; UKTS 1983 No 27; 
13 ILM 605. 
Agreement among Pacific Island States Concerning the Implementation and 
Administration of the Treaty of Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific 
Island States and the Government of the United States of America (2 April 1987) 
NZTS 1988 No 32; ATS 1988 No 42. 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959 ( 4 
October 1991) 1991 ILM 461; UKTS 1999 No 6 (cm 4256); NZTS 1998 No 3. 
Convention on the Conservation of Andromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean (11 
February 1992) <http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/npas.htm> (last accessed 3 February 
2002) 
Convention on Biological Diversity (June 5 1992) 31 ILM 818; NZTS 1993 No 18. 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
<www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 51/aconfl 5126-/annex l .htm> 
February 2002) 
(14 June 1992) 
(last accessed 3 
Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the 
South Pacific Region (9 July 1992) 1993 ILM 136. 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (10 May 1993) UNTS 
1819 359; NZTS 1994 No 11. 
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (24 November 1993), United Nations 
58 
Department of Oceans and Law of the Sea and Food and Agriculture Organisation 
International Fisheries Instruments (United Nations, New York, 1998) 41-50. 
Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (25 
November 1993) <http: //www.oceanlaw.net/texts/iotc.htm> (last accessed 3 February 
2002). 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollack Resources in the Central 
Bering Sea (16 June 1994) <www.oceanlaw.net/texts/bering.htm> (last accessed 3 
February 2002). 
Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries (30 September 
1994) <http: //www.oceanlaw.net/texts/micronesia.htm> (last accessed 3 February 
2002). 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (29 September 1995) United Nations 
Department of Oceans and Law of the Sea and Food and Agriculture Organisation 
International Fisheries Instruments (United Nations, New York, 1998) 56-80. 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions for the United Nations Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks ( 4 December 1995), United 
Nations Department of Oceans and Law of the Sea and Food and Agriculture 
Organisation International Fisheries Instruments (United Nations, New York, 1998) 
7-38. 
Agreement Among the Governments of Canada, Governments of Member States of 
the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the 
Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of America on 
Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation and Utilisation of the 
Permanently manned Civil Space Station (29 January 1998) published as schedule to 
Civil International Space Station Implementation Act 1999 (Canada) 
Agreement Between The Government of Iceland, The Government of Norway And 
The Government of The Russia Federation Concerning Certain Aspects Of 
Cooperation in the Area of Fisheries (15 May 1999) 
<http: //www.oceanlaw.net/texts/barents.htm> (last accessed 3 February 2002). 
Framework Agreement for the Conservation of Living Marine Resources on the High 
Seas of the South Pacific (Galapagos Agreement) (14 August 1999) 
<http: //www.oceanlaw.net/texts/galapogos.htm> (last accessed 3 February 2002) 
Convention on The Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (5 September 2000) 
<http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/westpac.htm> (last accessed 3 February 2002). 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources In the South-
East Atlantic Ocean (20 April 2001) <http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/seafo.htm> (last 
accessed 3 February 2002). 
D 
B 
u 
59 
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Umeported and 
Umegulated Fishing (2001) <http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/x6729e/x6700.htm> 
(last accessed 3 February 2002) 
Table of Books 
R Bernhadt (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law Vo! 3 (Elesvier, 
Amsterdam, 1991). 
Boleslaw Adam Boczek Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1962). 
Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (5th ed, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1998). 
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs The Law of 
the Sea: Regime for High seas Fisheries: Status and Prospects (United Nations, New 
York, 1992). 
GE Fogg, A History of Antarctic Science (Cambridge, University Press, 1992). 
Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds) Oppenheim 's International Law Voll 
(91h ed, Longman, Harlow Essex, 1992). 
George C. Kasoulides Port State Control and Jurisdiction: Evolution of the Port State 
Regime (M Nijhoff, Boston, 1993). 
Karl-Herman Kock, Antarctic Fish and Fisheries (Cambridge, University Press, 
1992). 
Covey T Oliver The International Legal System (41h ed, Foundation Press, New York, 
1995) 
Harry N Scheiber ( ed) Law of the Sea: The Common Heritage and Emerging 
Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague; Boston, 2000). 
MN Shaw International Law (Grotius Publications Ltd, Cambridge, 1991) 337. 
Brian D Smith State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1988) 
Sir Arthur Watts International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System (Cambridge, 
Grotius Publications Limited, 1992) 
60 
Table of Articles and Papers 
DJ Agnew "The Illegal and Unregulated Fishery for Toothfish in the Southern Ocean, 
and the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme" (2000) 24 Marine Policy 361-374. 
ASOC ECO 2 Paper informally circulated at CCAMLR XVill (Hobart, October 2 
1999) 
ASOC "Southern Ocean Goldrush" (1997) The Antarctic Project 6 (2) 3-4. 
ASOC Report on the XIVth Meeting of the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (ASOC, Auckland and Washington, 1995) 
David S Ardia "Does the Emperor Have No Clothes" Enforcement of International 
Laws Protecting the Marine Environment" (1998) 19 Mich J Int'l K 497. 
David J Bederman "CCAMLR in Crisis: A Case Study of Marine Management in the 
Southern Oceans" in H N Scheiber ( ed) The Law of the Sea (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2000) 169. 
Eric Thomas Berkman "Responses to the International Child Sec Tourism Trade" 
(1996) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 397. 
Christopher L Blakesley "Criminal Law: United States Jurisdiction Over 
Extraterritorial Crime" (1982) 73 J Crim & Criminology 1109. 
Kevin Bray "A Global Review of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing 
Paper presented to the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing organised by the Government of Australia in cooperation with the F AO 
(Sydney, 15-19 May 2000) AUS:IUU/2000/6. 
Kevin Bray "Fish or Fowl: Can the Law of the Sea and International Fisheries Co-
Exist?" Paper presented at the 9th Annual Meeting of the Australian and New Zealand 
Society of International Law, Canberra, Australia, 13-14 June 2001. 
Beth C Clark and Alan D Hemmings "Problems and Prospects for CCAMLR Twenty 
Years On" (2001) 4 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 1. 
Cyrille De Klemm "Fisheries Management and Marine Biological Diversity" in Ellen 
Hey (ed) Developments in International Fisheries Law (Kluwer, The Netherlands, 
1999) 423. 
Paul Stephen Dempsey "Compliance and Enforcement in International Law: Oil 
Pollution of the Marine Environment by Ocean Vessels" (1984) 6 J International law 
L Bus 459. 
• 
61 
Emeka Duruigbo "Multinational Corporations and Compliance with International 
Regulations Relating to the Petroleum Industry" (2001) 7 Ann Surv Int'l & Comp L 
101. 
Emeka Duruigbo "Reforming the International Law and Policy on Marine Oil 
Pollution" (2000) 31 J Mar L & Com 65. 
David Edwards & John A Heap, "Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources: A Commentary," (1981) 20 Polar Record 353. 
Wade Estey "The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality" (1997) Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 177. 
John Fitzpatrick, "Measures to Enhance the Capability of Flag State to Exercise 
Effective Control Over a Fishing Vessels" Paper presented to the Expert Consultation 
on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing organised by the Government of 
Australia in cooperation with the FAO (Sydney, 15-19 May 2000) AUS:IUU/2000/11. 
Elana Geddis "Resource and Environment: International Environmental Law: 
Covering the Gaps for the 21 51 Century'' ANZIL/ASIL Conference, 26-29 June 2000, 
Canberra and Sydney. 
Harvard Research in International Law "Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime" (1935) 
29 AM J Int'l L 474. 
Margaret A Healy "Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists At Home: Do Laws in Sweden, 
Australia, and the United States Safeguard the Rights of Children As Mandated by 
International Law?" (1995) 18 Fordham Int'l LJ 1852. 
John A. Heap "Has CCAMLR Worked? Management Policies and Ecological Needs" 
in Amfinn Jorgensen-Dahl & Willy Ostreng (eds) The Antarctic Treaty System in 
World Politics, (St Martins Press, New York, 1991) 43. 
Sean Hem "Competing Values: Taking a Broad View on the Narrowing Conservation 
Regime of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" (2000) 16 Am 
U Int'l L Rev 177. 
Richard Herr "The International Regulation of Patagonian Toothfish: CCAMLR and 
High Seas Fisheries Management" in Olav Schram Stokke ( ed) Governing High Seas 
Fisheries Management: The Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford, 
University Press, 2001) 303. 
Rosalyn Higgens "The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction" in Professor Cecil J Olmstead (ed) 
Extraterritorial Application Of Laws And Responses Thereto (ECS Publishing Ltd, 
Oxford, 1984) 
62 
Sir Robert Jennings, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust 
Laws" (1957) 33 Brit Yb Int'l L 146. 
Christopher C Joyner "Compliance and Enforcement in New International Fisheries 
Law" (1998) 12 Temp Int'l & Comp L J 271. 
Christopher C Joyner "The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica: the Dilemmas 
ofNon-Sovereign Jurisdiction" (1988) 19 Ocean Dev and Int'l Law 469. 
Shalom Kassan "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Ancient World" (1935) 29 Am J 
Int ' l L 237. 
Stuart B Kaye "Legal Approaches to Polar Fisheries Regimes: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources and the Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention" (1995) 26 Case W Res 
Int'l LJ 75 . 
Masuyaki Komatsu "The Importance of Taking Cooperative Action Against Specific 
Fishing Vessels that are Diminishing Effectiveness of Tuna Conservation and 
Management Measures" Paper presented to the Expert Consultation on Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing organised by the Government of Australia in 
cooperation with the PAO (Sydney, 15-19 May 2000) AUS:IDU/2000/5. 
Blaise Kuemlangan "National Legislative Options to Combat IDU Fishing", Paper 
presented to the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
organised by the Government of Australia in cooperation with the F AO (Sydney, 15-
19 May 2000) AUS:IDU:2000/9. 
M Lack and G Sant "Patagonian Toothfish: Are Conservation Measures Working?" 
(2001) Offprint from Traffic Bulletin 19(1) 
Terje Lobach "Measures to be Adopted by the Port State in Combating IDU Fishing" 
Paper presented to the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing organised by the Government of Australia in cooperation with the F AO 
(Sydney, 15-19 May 2000) AUS :IDU/2000/15. 
Gail Lutgen, "The Rise and Fall of the Patagonian Toothfish: Food for Thought" 
(1997) 27 Envl Pol & Law 401. 
FA Mann "The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law" (1964) 111 Recueil des 
Cours 1. 
David F Matlin "Re-evaluating the Status of Flags of Convenience Under 
International Law" (1991) 23 Vand J Transnat'l L 1017. 
63 
Myres S McDougal, William T Burke, and Ivan A Vlasic "The Maintenance of Public 
Order at Sea and the Nationality of Ships" (1960) 54 American Journal of 
International Law 25. 
Erik Jaap Molenaar, "Southern Ocean Fisheries and the CCAMLR Regime" in Alex 
G Oude Elferink and Donald R Rothwell (eds) The Law of the Sea and Maritime 
Delimitation and Jurisdiction (Kluwer Law International, Great Britain, 2001) 293 . 
Ian J Popick "Are There Really Plenty of Fish in the Sea? The World Trade 
Organisation's Presence is Effectively Frustrating the International Community's 
Attempts to Conserve Chilean Sea Bass" (2001) 50 Emory LJ 939. 
Stacy J Ratner "Establishing the Extraterrestrial: Criminal Jurisdiction and the 
International Space Station" (1999) Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review 323. 
Penelope Ridings "Compliance, Enforcement and the Southern Oceans: The Need for 
a New Approach" in RA Herr (ed) Sovereignty at Sea: From Westphalia to Madrid 
(Wollongong Papers on Maritime Policy No 11, Centre for Maritime Policy, 
University of Wollongong, 2000) 17 5-190. 
Harry N Scheiber "Ocean Governance and the Marine Fisheries Crisis: Two Decades 
of Innovation and Frustration" (2001) 20 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 119. 
M Bryan Schneider and Jody Sturtz Shaffer "Annual Survey of Michigan Law: June 1 
1998 - May 31 1999: Constitutional Law" (2000) 46 Wayne L Rev 503 . 
S J Shields Out of Sight - Out of Mind? Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (LLM Research 
Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1981) 78. 
Yann-Huei Song "The Eco-system Approach: New Departures for Land and Water: 
Concluding Perspectives on Ecosystem Management" (1997) 24 Ecology LQ 861. 
David Vidas "Emerging Law on the Sea issues in the Antarctic Maritime Area: A 
Heritage for the New Century" (2000) 31 Ocean Dev and Int'l Law 197. 
Dr W M von Zharen "Ocean Eco-system Stewardship" (1998) 23 Wm & Mary Envtl 
L & Pol'y Rev 1. 
Budislav Vukas and Davor Vidas "Flags of Convenience and High Seas Fishing" in 
Olav Schram Stokke ed Governing High Seas Fisheries: The interplay of Global and 
Regional Regimes (Oxford, University Press, 2001) 53. 
Deirdre M Warner-Kramer and Krista Canty "Stateless Fishing Vessels: The Current 
International Regime and a new approach" (2000) Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 
227. 
64 
Geoffrey R Watson "Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal 
Jurisdiction" (1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 41. 
Prosper Weil "International Law Limitations on State Jurisdiction" in Cecil J 
Olmstead ( ed) Extraterritorial Application Of Laws And Responses Thereto (ECS 
Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 1984) 33. 
Fernando Zegers, "The Canberra Convention: Objectives and Political Aspects of its 
Negotiation, in Antarctic Resources Policy'' Francisco Orrego Vicuna (ed) in 
Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal and Political Issues (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1983) 149. 
Table of Reports and Declarations 
Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1997) 
Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1998) 
Report of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 1999) 
Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 2000) 
Report of the Twentieth Meeting of the Commission (CCAMLR, Hobart, 2001) 
Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (CCAMLR, Hobart, 
1998) 
Report of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (CCAMLR, Hobart, 
1999) 
Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (CCAMLR, Hobart, 
2000) 
Report of the Twentieth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (CCAMLR, Hobart, 
2001) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Commission for the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources CCAMLR XVII: Hobart 26 
October - 6 November 1998: Report of the New Zealand Delegation (Wellington, 
1998) 
"Report of a Parliamentary Committee Inquiring into the Legal Regimes of the 
Australian Antarctic Territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands 14-16 October 
65 
1992" in W Bush (ed) Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of InterState 
and National Documents (looseleaf, Oceania Publications Inc, New York) 
D.AU16101992. l. 
Committee of Inquiry into Shipping, Report 51 (HMSO, London, 1979) CMND 4337. 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc A/54/429, 
(United Nations, New York, 2000) 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc A/53/473, 
(United Nations, New York, 1999) 
F AO Report to the Seventy First Session of the International Maritime Organisation's 
Maritime Safety Committee (IMO, London, 19-28 May 1999) 
ISOFISH The Involvement of Mauritius in the Trade of Patagonian Toothfish from 
Illegal and Unregulated Longline Fishing in the Southern Ocean and What Might be 
Done About It Occasional Report No 1 (ISOFISH, Hobart, August 1998) 
ISOFISH The Chilean Fishing Industry: Its Involvement in and Connections to the 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Exploitation of Patagonian Toothfish in the 
Southern Ocean Occasional Report No 2 (ISOFISH, Hobart, March 1999) 
ISOFISH The Vikings: The Involvement of Norwegian Fishermen in Illegal and 
Unregulated Longline Fishing for Patagonian Tooth.fish in the Southern Ocean 
Occasional Report No 3 (ISOFISH, Hobart, October 1998) 
ISOFISH Tooth.fish Poachers Changing Vessel Names in an Attempt to Avoid 
Identification by the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme Report No 4 
(ISOFISH, Hobart, May 2000) 
ISOFISH Rogues Gallery <www.isofish.org.au> (last accessed 3 February 2001) 
ASOC "A CCAMLR Enforcement Regime" CCAMLR XVI/BG/38 27 October 1997 
United Nations Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1955 Volume 1: 
Summary records of the seventh session (United Nations, New York, 1960) 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority Implementation of the United Nations 
Fish Stocks Agreement (Discussion Paper, 2001) 
66 
ANNEX I: CONTRACTING PARTIES TO CCAMLR* 
Current Contracting Parties: 
Acceding States: 
Argentina 
Australia 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Chile 
European Community 
France 
Germany 
India 
Italy 
Japan 
Republic of Korea 
Namibia 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Russian Federation 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
Uruguay 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Finland 
Greece 
Netherlands 
Peru 
Non Contracting Parties invited to attend Commission meetings: 
Belize 
China 
Denmark 
Mauritius 
Panama 
Portugal 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Seychelles 
Vanuatu 
• Source: CCAMLR web page <http://www.ccamlr.org/English/e_m_ship/e_membership.htrn#Top of 
Page> (last accessed 2 February 2002) 
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